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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. PURPOSE
System Planning Corporation (SPC) conducted this study to examine the
operational effectiveness of a Multiple Aquila Control System (MACS) under
a variety of mission configurations. The study was prepared under a con-
tract with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), Pasadena, California.
B. BACKGROUND
SPC previously conducted two studies that suggested the use of a cen-
tralized launch and recovery concept. The first addressed the control of
multiple remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) using timesharing and other tech-
niques with standard RPV equipment [Ref. 1], and the second analyzed opera-
tions of a postulated centralized launch and recovery (CL&R) RPV system
[Ref. 2]. Those studies developed a methodology by which the complexity of
RPV section operations could be modeled in order to examine the performance
achieved using alternative RPV employment concepts. Though coarse, . the
model proved useful in recommending major operational enhancements to the
original RPV concept with independent forward sections. The RPV program has
since adopted the CL&R mode of operations in its operational concept.
The configuration of the MACS tactical unit is similar to that of the
RPV CL&R concept in that the launch and recovery elements are separate from
the forward ground control stations (FGCSs)• At the.centralized facility in
the rear division area, the pieces of equipment that distinguish MACS from
the current RPV CL&R concept are the centralized ground control station
(CGCS) and its associated central ground data terminal. The MACS CGCS is
required to control multiple airborne RPVs simultaneously, allowing the
system to be augmented with a variety of additional mission payloads.
"SPC was tasked to investigate the operational concept of the postu-
lated MACS unit and project its performance in coordinating RPV activities
under an increasing workload with additional missions. Five tasks were de-
veloped as a part of this study:
• Analyze the operational effectiveness of MACS for specified mis-
sion sets
Propose changes to equipment or procedures that might enhance
MACS effectiveness and reanalyze with changes incorporated
Determine system sensitivities to range from the MACS complex to
the FLOT
Estimate personnel and equipment requirements for specified mis-
sion sets
Estimate data rates required for ground coordination between MACS
units for mission sets.
C. SCOPE
At the time the above tasks were written, the RPV CL&R concept in-
cluded four forward sections. It is now expected that there will be three
forward sections. All analyses in this study reflect the original guidance.
The analyses of MACS operations are structured to examine missions
whose required on-station coverage is continuous/ compared to the original
RPV concept of three 3-hour target acquisition, designation, and aerial
reconnaissance (TADAR) missions per day. Comparisons between the results of
these analyses and previous program documentation are applicable only where
this consideration has been incorporated.
The scenario chosen for this work prescribes an operations concept
that, for the purpose of writing a definitive computer simulation, allo-
cates priorities to the types of mission conducted and prevents operations
for some types of pay loads at the FGCS or CGCS. For example, this study
assumes TADAR missions always have top priority and are never controlled by
the CGCS, and operations for alternate payloads are never conducted at the
FGCS. The RPV platoon is a division asset whose allocation and specific
functions will be as directed by the division commander and, therefore, not
necessarily according to the assumptions described herein. The postulated
MACS operational concept has been coordinated with various RPV program par-
ticipants but is not to be construed as official or approved doctrine nor
as prescribing fixed procedures that deprive the commander of his preroga-
tives.
D. APPROACH
The unique characteristics of MACS, namely multiple airborne RPVs with
various different missions, provided the impetus to develop a computer sim-
ulation to address the first three tasks mentioned above. The methodology
used in previous SPC studies consisted of manually stepping through the
various time-ordered events during a.typical RPV mission, using decision
theory to assign probabilities of occurrence for each event, generating
computer-assisted subroutines where necessary, thereby arriving at average
time on station and turnaround time for each mission. No more than two RPVs
were airborne at the same time: one each under the control of the FGCS and
CGCS.
In moving to a MACS system that can control up to eight air vehicles
(AVs) at a time, it was felt that essentially the same operational method-
ology could be used to examine system performance, but a computer would be
more efficient at keeping track of eight RPV missions plus those of the
four FGCSs. Some operational procedures that were necessarily simplified
for the manual model have been more accurately integrated into the simula-
tion with their effects contributing to the results.
The first step in structuring the simulation is to specify the charac-
teristics that will govern MACS operations. They include the battlefield
environment that generates the requests for RPV missions, operating time-
lines of the RPV-peculiar equipment, maintenance requirements, vulnera-
bility to enemy fire, etc. The set of- assumptions and inputs used to form
the rules under which this simulation is run are discussed in Chapter II.
With these rules fixed, the model can generate a mission event pro-
file, or a sequence of events during the course of a mission, that might
occur under the specified circumstances. A large number of stochastically
dissimilar mission profiles are generated under the same set of fixed
rules. If enough profiles are generated, all the possible combinations of
events that could occur during the course of a mission will be represented
and in the proper proportion relative to all other events. This effect is
created in the model by simulating MACS operations over a long period of
time until enough missions have been generated to consider probabilistic
effects negligible. A discussion of how many missions or how many days of
operations are necessary appears in Chapter III.
The results of all missions are analyzed and reduced to several key
measures of effectiveness, including AV losses, mission coverages, and
queueing delays in-key operational procedures. Then, the rules (inputs or
assumptions) are changed and the sequence above repeated. Results of the
second computer run, representing an equally large number of mission pro-
files created under the new set of fixed rules for that run, are then com-
pared to those of the first. Differences between the results of the two
runs are assumed to have been caused by the differences between the fixed
inputs or assumptions for each. Such an assumption is valid when probabil-
istic effects of individual rare events are not significant enough to in-
fluence the overall results. Results of baseline computer runs and excur-
sions with proposed system enhancements appear in Chapter III.
Separate analyses were conducted for the last two tasks. Personnel and
equipment requirements are estimated based on current allocations and
changes that would be expected for equipping a MACS as new missions are
added. Command, control, and communications (C3) data rates are estimated
by determining how many messages are passed and what information is neces-
sary in them to support ground coordination between MACS sections. These
analyses are discussed in Chapter IV.
The results of this study are most useful in determining trends be-
tween different mission configurations rather than as absolute measurements
of performance. This is primarily influenced by the specification for con-
tinuous operations, which is the most stringent operational condition and
may be unlikely for extended periods of time on the battlefield. However,
during surge situations, continuous coverage by any or all of the missions
included in the study may be required for short periods. Consequently, the
simulation is structured to portray MACS at peak demand levels.
E. FINDINGS
1. Baseline Simulation Runs
Overall mission performances degrade gradually as mission types are
added to the basic TADAR mission until the fourth alternate, the addition
of which causes mission coverages to decline and system delays to increase
sharply. Simultaneous control of eight RPVs by MACS is sufficient to handle
the basic TADAR mission plus three additional missions. Beyond that point,
launcher delays also dominate due to the number of total missions being
processed.
The additional number of missions generated by the use of a TADAR hot
spare continually on station strains system operations such that all mis-
sion coverages are reduced. A revised hot spare concept could increase cov-
erages by as much as 5 percent but would not alleviate existing ground sys-
tem delays. The suggested concept would call for using the hot spare to
replace not only unexpected losses in mission coverage (such as from AV
kill, AV failure, or payload malfunction), but also to service certain ex-
pected coverage gaps. In particular, when a freshly emplaced forward ground
control station {FGCS) calls for a new TADAR mission, a hot spare could
service the request rather than wait for an AV from the CL&R facility to
arrive at the mission area.
Assuming a 0.95 probability of survival and equipment reliabilities
stated in design specifications, 20 days of continuous operations for one
MACS platoon using only the TADAR mission will deplete that platoon's war-
time allocation of RPVs if the current production plans are maintained. If
the MACS concept with multiple mission types is adopted, more air vehicles
will be required to support a war effort. The 20-day surge operation scen-
ario was chosen to provide sufficient statistical smoothing to the output
data and does not necessarily represent an operational requirement.
2. Simulation Excursions
A base load of 13 TADAR AVs and 3 each of other payload types is suf-
ficient to sustain continuous FGCS operations at a high level of effective-
ness. A .base load of 10 TADAR AVs provides comparable mission coverage and
may be adequate if delays are acceptable.
The addition of a third launcher would decrease launcher delays enough
to allow a fourth alternate mission to be flown by MACS. The third recovery
system and CGCS do not significantly benefit system operations. The latter
point reflects the observations that recovery operations are not a bottle-
neck ift the system, and the third CGCS and MACS antenna do not increase the
allowable number of RPVs controlled by the central facility.
Even with a reduced survivability of 0.75, when the MACS facility is
already heavily loaded with RPV missions, the benefits of the hot spare are
outweighed by delays caused because of the number of extra missions it gen-
erates. However, when system operations are not otherwise tasked by addi-
tional RPV mission types, the hot spare provides equal or better TADAR cov-
erage (in a low- survivability environment) than in runs when it is not
used. Also, when the kill rate is high, a fast resupply time (3 hours) in
combination with the hot spare option alleviates most hot-spare-related
burdens.
Payload interchange times appear to cause unacceptable delays for that
procedure to be included in launch preparations for continuous-coverage
missions. Interchanges are assumed to take an average of about 1 hour
apiece to perform. It can be a valuable procedure if planned and performed
in advance for singular or noncontinuous missions. However, continuous mis-
sions achieve more time on station when mission requests are serviced with
the next available intact AV-and-payload rather than initiating payload
interchange procedures when the required intact AV-and-payload is not imme-
diately available.
Halving the total time the CL&R facility spends in displacement in-
creases mission coverages significantly. The computer simulation assumed
CL&Rs would displace twice per day; according to inputs postulated by the
RPV TRADOC systems manager (TSM). Moving only once per day, or once every
other day if doctrine allows, is preferable.
If a 5-hour planned flight endurance were achievable for TADAR-
equipped RPVs (including the hot spare)/ it would produce a significantly
higher percentage of continuous coverage than missions with a 3-hour TADAR
endurance. The current RPV" air vehicle is designed and configured to
achieve a 3-hour flight endurance with either a television or forward-
looking infrared (FLIR) package.
3 . MACS-to-FLQT Range
A 35-kilometer MACS-to-FLOT range appears to be a good compromise
between factors that argue for both a shorter and a longer distance. The
computer simulation showed RPV mission performance to be relatively insen-
sitive to variations in range from the CL&R to the PLOT. The best location
for the MACS central facility will likely be determined by factors not
modeled in this simulation, such as the MACS command and control structure,
methods of communication between forward and rear MACS units, the range of
the modular integrated control and navigation system (MICNS) data line, and
ground system vulnerability. As the former points are being resolved by the
RPV community, the latter factor argues for a MACS location outside the
range of enemy proliferation artillery, but otherwise as close to the for-
ward area as-possible to lessen technical C challenges.
4. Personnel and Equipment Requirements
An additional 18 personnel, eight 5-ton trucks with associated RPV
equipment, and 12 AVs are estimated to be required for the fully loaded
mission set with four alternate missions as compared to the basic TADAR-
only mission in the MACS concept with two CLSRs.
5. Ground Coordination
It is estimated that the total number of messages passed between MACS
units for coordination of standard continuous operations will be less than
400 per day on the average. Each message should average less than 10 items
of information, including standard headers.
P. RECOMMENDATIONS
The hot spare should be used on an as-needed basis in brigade-sized
areas where continuous coverage is essential for indefinite periods of
time. Since it is unlikely that continuous TADAR coverage will be required
across the division front for extended periods, the hot spare concept is
best suited to smaller areas of responsibility where high AV kill rates are
expected and the hot spare mission can be assigned a high priority at the
CL&R section. If division-wide hot spare operations are desired, it should
be used both for expected and unexpected replacements of lost mission cov-
erage .
A base load of 10 TADAR RPVs'at the CL&R facility combined with a re-
supply concept where RPVs are replaced more often (instead of waiting for a
carrier truck to be free of its three AVs) should be investigated as a po-
tential method of reducing costs over the currently planned base load of 16
RPVs in the all-TADAR CL&R concept.
The feasibility of the MICNS data link controlling more than eight
RFVs at a time using "park-and-fly" schemes should be investigated. This
study assumed each RPV under MACS control required full-time use of one of
the eight available control slots. For missions that require only station
keeping with infrequent updates, existing dead-reckoning and link-acquisi-
tion features of the MICNS can be implemented to provide other missions
greater access to the available eight slots.
Efforts to provide the maximum endurance for RPV missions should be
continued in view of the enhanced coverages achieved by such missions in
the simulation.
Enhanced .mission performance achieved with the introduction of im-
proved reliability and maintenance figures indicates that tradeoffs should
be investigated vis-a-vis continued efforts to increase equipment reliabil-
ity as an alternative to pursuing other system enhancements postulated in
this study.

II. STRUCTURING THE COMPUTER SIMULATION
A. BACKGROUND
The configuration of the MACS tactical unit is similar to that of the
current RPV CL&R concept in that the launch and recovery elements are sep-
arate from the forward control sections. The four forward sections in an
RPV or MACS platoon have relatively low equipment and manpower requirements
to conduct that mission. They are attached one each to one of a variety of
possible division elements, as directed by the division commander, includ-
ing direct support (DS) and general support (GS) artillery battalions,
division tactical headquarters, aviation battalion, and military intelli-
gence battalion, among others.
At the centralized facility in the rear division area, the most sig-
nificant functionally different pieces of equipment that distinguish MACS
from the current RPV CL&R concept are the centralized ground data terminal
(CGDT) and centralized ground control station (CGCS), hereafter collec-
tively and loosely referred to by the latter term only. .The MACS CGCS is
required to control up to eight airborne RPVs simultaneously, allowing the
system to be augmented with a variety of additional mission payloads.
Launch and recovery equipment, air vehicle handlers, maintenance shelters,
and cargo vehicles remain essentially the same as in the current CL&R con-
cept (see Chapter IV for a discussion of personnel and equipment require-
ments of the MACS).
The initial studies by SPC concerning control of multiple RPVs using
timesharing and other techniques with standard RPV- equipment [Ref. 1] and
operations of a postulated CL&R RPV system [Ref. 2] lay the groundwork for
this study and the computer simulation employed. Those studies developed a
methodology by which the complexity of RPV section operations could be mod-
eled in order to examine the performance achieved using alternative RPV em-
ployment concepts. Though coarse, the model proved useful in recommending
major operational enhancements to the original RPV" concept with independent
forward sections.
1At the time the computer simulation was written, the RPV CL&R concept
included four forward sections. Doctrine subsequently changed so that it is
now expected that there will be three forward sections. All analyses in
this study reflect the original guidance.
Preceding page blank
The requirements of the MACS effort provided the impetus to develop an
all-computer simulation. The original methodology consisted of manually
stepping through the various time-ordered events during a typical RPV mis-
sion, using decision theory to assign probabilities of occurrence for each
event, generating computer-assisted subroutines where necessary (e.g., cal-
culating, through queueing theory, the expected delays -at the launcher, re-
covery subsystem, etc., during stress situations), thereby arriving at
average time on station and turnaround time for each mission. No more than
two RPVs were airborne at the same time: one each under the control of the
forward GCS and the central GCS.
In moving to a MACS system that can control up to eight AVs at a time,
it was felt that essentially the same operational methodology could be used
to examine system performance, but a computer would be more efficient at
keeping track of those eight RPV missions plus those of the four forward
ground stations. Also, the computer simulation uses a Monte Carlo approach,
in which continuous MACS operations are run over a sufficient period of
time, and results from many missions over that time are summed and averaged
to arrive at performance data, including variability, for a particular type
of mission set. In this way, some operational procedures that were neces-
sarily simplified for the manual model have been more accurately integrated
into the simulation with their effects contributing to the results.
B. METHODOLOGY OF MACS COMPUTER SIMULATION
The first step in structuring the simulation is to specify the charac-
teristics that will govern MACS operations. They include the battlefield
environment that generates the requests for RPV missions, operating time-
lines of the RPV-peculiar equipment, maintenance requirements, vulnerabil-
ity to enemy fire, etc. The set of assumptions and inputs used to form the
rules under which this simulation is run are discussed later in the chap-
ter.
With these rules fixed, the model can generate a mission event pro-
file, or a sequence of events during the course of a mission, that might
occur under the specified circumstances. Each time a mission event profile
is generated, it can be different from any other because of the probabil-
ities associated with the occurrence of events. These probabilities will
dictate the eventual outcome of missions according to the rules that repre-
sent or simulate actual MACS operations.
A large number of stochastically dissimilar mission profiles are gen-
erated under the same set of fixed rules. If enough profiles are generated,
all the possible combinations of events that could occur during the course
of a mission will be represented and in the proper proportion relative to
all other events. This effect is created in the model by simulating MACS
operations over a long period of time until enough missions fulfilling
combat requirements have been generated to consider probabilistic effects
negligible. One computer run generates those missions. A discussion of how
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many missions or how many days of operations are necessary appears in Chap-
ter III. •
The results of all missions are analyzed and reduced to several key
measures of effectiveness", which are discussed later in this chapter. Then,
the rules (inputs or assumptions) are changed and the sequence, above re-
peated. Results of the second computer run, representing an equally large
number of mission profiles created under the new set of fixed rules for
that run, are then compared to those of the first. Differences between the
results of the two runs are assumed to have been caused by the differences
between the fixed inputs or assumptions for each. Such an assumption is
valid when probabilistic effects of individual rare events are not signifi-
cant enough to influence the overall results.
C. TYPICAL TADAR MISSION
Within the computer, files are created that represent the status of
pieces of equipment in the MACS platoon and the status of actions or events
that affect the equipment. Files are maintained on each CGCS, FGCS,
launcher subsystem, recovery subsystem, air vehicle, and mission payload.
Those pieces of information on equipment status are coordinated through
master files, called mission request files (MRFs), which are chronological
records of RPV missions from the generation of a mission request through
mission termination. During each cycle of the main program, the simulation
moves into successive time increments (usually 1-minute increments) and up-
dates each file.
*
Equipment files are checked for possible failure during the current
increment (based on reliability inputs), are maintained in present status
if no changes occurred, or are updated to reflect a new status (e.g., when
repair is complete to a failed item, it moves into an "operational"
status).
As an example, mission states that an MRF might pass through during a
typical successful TADAR mission are shown in Figure 1. The MRF is. created
by a request for a new mission, perhaps generated because a replacement
will be required soon for a TADAR AV nearing the end of its current mis-
sion. The simulation is designed to receive an input specifying how long
before the end of an ongoing mission a new mission request should be gener-
ated to ensure no gaps in mission coverage, given normal operating condi-
tions.
The first state into which the new MRF is placed is AWAITING AV, in
which it a.oks for an AV to be assigned to that mission request. Generally,
that happens immediately but will be delayed if the base load of AVs is de-
pleted. In that case, the MRF will not move to a new state until the resup-
ply truck arrives with a new load of AVs, or an AV returning from a mission
is. recovered and made available for this new mission.
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Since the simulation considers that modular RPV payloads can be inter-
changed among AVs, an AV whose payload has been removed due to a previous
failure may become available before one that has the appropriate payload.
The MKF would move to EMPTY AV AVAILABLE and ask for a payload to be in-
stalled, which takes time. Another state (not shown) could be AV AVAILABLE,
WRONG PAYLOAD, in which case payload removal and installation are required
with additional delays.
Mission Request Generated
AWAITING AV
»
EMPTY AV AVAILABLE
"PAYLOAD INSTALLED
" PREFLIGHT PREPARATION
" AWAITING LAUNCHER
' ON LAUNCHER AWAITING BEAM
' PRELAUNCH CHECKOUT
CLIMBOUT
' TRANSIT OUT FRIENDLY
' TRANSIT OUT FOE
HANDOFF
PERFORMING MISSION
' AWAITING HANDBACK
HANDBACK
TRANSIT BACK FOE
TRANSIT BACK FRIENDLY
AWAITING NET
RECOVERY
Rgure 1. Typical TADAR Mission Profile
When installation or interchange is completed, the MRF moves to PAY-
LOAD INSTALLED. Under most circumstances, this state is reached with no
time delay after the MRF is created because the base load should have
enough TADAR AVs to fill the request immediately. PREFLIGHT PREPARATION is
next. During this phase, which takes an amount of time as specified in the
input parameters, the AV is fueled, checked in the maintenance shelter, and
moved to the launch area.
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When preparation is completed, the MRF moves to an AWAITING LAUNCHER
state. If all launchers are currently unavailable because they are being
used, being repaired, or displacing, the MRF waits. When a launcher is
available, the AV is loaded and the MRF becomes ON LAUNCHER AWAITING BEAM.
The "beam" refers to one of the available control slots in the MACS multi-
ple control antenna, which can direct up to eight AVs at a time. This MRF
state is the simuration's way of saying that if the CGCS already has con-
trol of eight AVs, another "beam" is not available and the new mission must
wait until one becomes available before the AV can be processed and
launched. There is also a priority structure in the program so that when a
"beam" becomes free, it might be assigned to a higher priority action
(e.,g., an RPV requiring immediate recovery) before the launch request is
filled.
The available beam is assigned to the RPV on the launcher, and PRE-
LAUNCH CHECKOUT begins. An input specifies how much time is spent in this
activity, after which the AV is launched and the MRF moves into CLIMBOUT.
An equipment failure at any point in the sequence up to AV launch may
result in mission delays, but will not cause a catastrophic loss of an AV.
As an example of the effects equipment failures can have on the progress of
a mission request up to this point, consider the PRELAUNCH CHECKOUT phase.
If the launcher fails during this procedure, the MRF is terminated and
another is created starting at AWAITING AV. The failed launcher enters a
repair phase, the AV is unloaded and returned to the base load, one beam is
freed up for assignment to another MRF, and the just-terminated MRF is
processed by an analysis routine for compilation of its vital statistics.
Meanwhile, the newly created MRF will most likely be assigned the same AV
that just came off the failed launcher, unless a higher priority mission
requires that AVV Since the AV has the proper payload and has already been
through preflight preparation, the new MRF will move directly to AWAITING
LAUNCHER with no time passed 'since the failure. If another launcher is
available, the mission continues. The only delays from the progress of the
original MRF are the sunk time spent in PRELAUNCH CHECKOUT before launcher
failure, the unload time, and reload time. If no other launchers are avail-
able, the AV waits and delays increase. •
Equipment failures once the AV is airborne may result in delays or
loss of an AV. For instance, if the mission payload fails during CLIMBOUT,
the AV will be immediately returned and another mission request generated,
resulting in a gap in coverage. On the other hand, if the AV fails during
CLIMBOUT, it is considered lost.
2The equipment file for that particular AV records its status at every
instant independent of the MRF, which records the status of the mission.
Since the AV has already been fueled, etc., it is returned to the base load
in the "prepared" status.
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The remainder of states in Figure 1 through which the MRF would pass
in this example are similar to those used from previously mentioned studies
but with several refinements. CLIMBOUT occurs at a specified vertical rate
until the AV reaches an altitude at which it begins to move towards the
FLOT while continuing to climb. The transition point (dictated by AV alti-
tude) from CLIMBOUT to TRANSIT OUT FRIENDLY is calculated based on an input
specifying AV altitude when crossing the FLOT (or the on-station altitude
if the mission is not over enemy territory). Another input to the program
governs how far the AV moves during each time increment while in transit.
The MRF state becomes TRANSIT OUT FOE when the AV crosses the FLOT,
beyond which it is vulnerable to enemy fire. Probability of survival is
calculated during each time increment beyond the FLOT, whether on station
or in transit. If the RPV is killed, a new MRF is immediately generated to
replace it.
HANDOFF is assumed to take place at a specified distance beyond the
FLOT (see paragraph G.12 in this chapter), where the TADAR mission is
assumed to start. The MACS CGCS relinquishes control of the AV, taking some
time and with a specified probability of success, while the FGCS assumes
control. Normally, this procedure will occur simultaneously with a handback
of the returning AV having just completed its time on station.
After HANDOFF, the MRF goes to PERFORMING MISSION. Whether an AV per-
forms its mission at a relatively stationary point or over a wide area at
varying altitudes is irrelevant to the simulation, since time of coverage
provided is the critical parameter sought.
PERFORMING MISSION time is finished when the AV has enough fuel to
make it back to the CL&R section without using any reserve fuel, assuming
no unexpected situations arise on the way back. Before HANDBACK to the MACS
CGCS can commence, the MRF may spend -some time in AWAITING HANDBACK as it
waits for a beam to become available. 'Since a returning TADAR RPV has the
highest priority, it should receive the first beam that becomes available
under any circumstance. Normally, it simply uses the beam made available by
the outbound replacement AV.
Once HANDBACK is complete, the MRF moves through TRANSIT BACK states
of FOE and FRIENDLY, shedding the likelihood of being killed as it crosses
back over the FLOT towards the recovery area. TRANSIT BACK occurs at a
slower velocity than TRANSIT OUT because the RPV is descending at virtually
idle engine speed after crossing the FLOT.
When the AV reaches the recovery area, the MRF is put in AWAITING NET
to check for the availability of a recovery subsystem. If more than one AV
requires recovery, the one with the least fuel remaining gets priority.
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D. DESCRIPTION OF MISSION SETS
The baseline mission sets to be examined with the computer simulation
are designed with three primary purposes:
• To measure the sensitivity of MACS operational effectiveness to
the number of simultaneous missions it is required to sustain
• To determine the overload point, at which there is a sharp de-
cline in system effectiveness due to workload
• To provide a data base from which to postulate and compare meth-
ods of enhancing operational effectiveness of a MACS.
The mission sets are summarized schematically in Figure 2 and de-
scribed as follows. Each mission number in the figure comprises one com-
puter run with hundreds of missions flown over a period of days.
MISSION NUMBER
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
TADAR
HS
ALTERNATE 1 (RR)
ALTERNATE 2 (MTI)
ALTERNATE 3A
3B
ALTERNATE 4A
4B
MISSIONS PER DAY
WITHOUT HS
WITH HS
48 53 61 66 69 75 81
64 69 77 82 85 91 97
Figure 2. Baseline Mission Sets
First, the TADAR RPV mission is examined by itself. It includes hand-
over of AVs from the CL&R facility to four forward GCSs while the AV is
over the target area. Continuous mission coverage is desired in each of the
four target areas for a division. AVs with the TADAR mission payload have
enough fuel for a 3-hour flight plus a 15-minute reserve. Alternate pay-
loads discussed below have differing weights, causing mission endurances to
vary due to more or less fuel available on board. Endurances used in the
model as stated in the following paragraphs are representative of how the
associated payloads would affect mission times but are not necessarily ac-
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curate at this time. As payload development programs mature, more accurate
estimates of endurance will become available.
That basic mission is also examined in run number 2 with the addition
of an orbiting hot spare (HS) .continuously on station 10 kilometers on the
friendly side of the PLOT until called to replace an RPV lost due to enemy
action or'other causes. Based on SPC's previous analyses, the hot spare can
be expected to greatly reduce the replacement time for lost AVs, thereby
increasing the fraction of mission coverage, but at an expense of more com-
plex central facility operations, increased maintenance requirements, and
possibly more AVs in the base load.
Subsequent baseline mission sets involve the cumulative addition of
RPVs with alternate mission payloads to the basic TADAR mission set (with
and without a hot spare) described above. The alternate mission payloads
represent a generic set of potential RPV missions characterized by contin-
uous operations. They are distinguished from one another for the purposes
of the simulation primarily by their mission altitude, penetration or non-
penetration of the PLOT, and mission endurance. For the purposes of this
study, all alternate missions are assumed to be controlled from the MACS
CGCS. In practice, the FGCS may conduct a variety of these missions in
addition to the TADAR mission, at the-direction of the division commander.
The first alternate to be added is a radio relay (RR) mission (runs 3
and 4). The requirement is for continuous on-station coverage for radio
relay RPVs orbiting 10 kilometers on the friendly side of the FLOT at an
altitude of 10,000 feet. Each AV has enough fuel for 5 hours on station
plus travel to and from the orbit point and reserves.
The third pair of runs adds a moving target indicator (MTI) radar mis-
sion as a second alternate to the RR and TADAR sets. The MACS CGCS will
guide the MTI RPVs to a mission altitude of 10,000 feet and up to 30 kilo-
meters beyond the FLOT, receiving MTI video data through the MICNS data
link from each on-station RPV. Fuel is provided for a 3-hour on-station
time plus travel and reserves. Continuous mission coverage is desired.
The final baseline mission set (runs 7 through 14) involves two alter-
nate RPV missions that are added to the above mission set at four different
request rates. The mission payloads for these alternates are unspecified,
but their mission profiles are the same as either the RR or MTI profiles
described previously. The configurations to be examined are as follows (all
include with and without TADAR hot spare):
Runs 7, 8 Add to the TADAR, RR, and MTI missions a third alternate
(called 3A) that, like the RR, orbits at an altitude of
10,000 feet, 10 kilometers on the friendly side of the
FLOT. Its on-station time is 5 hours and continuous cov-
erage is specified. This mission adds about five extra
launches and recoveries per day to system operations in
'runs 6 and 7. •
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Runs 9, 10 Instead of the above, add alternate 3B, whose mission
payload and station orbit point are the same as for
alternate 3A, but whose on-station time is 3 hours. This
adds eight e^ xtra missions per day to runs 6 and 7.
Runs 11, 12 To alternate 3B, add a fourth alternate (4A), which,
like the MTI, penetrates to 30 kilometers' beyond the
PLOT at a mission altitude of 10,000 feet. Its on-
station time is 4 hours for an additional load of six
missions per day more than runs 9 and 10.
Runs 13, 14 Instead of using 4A, add an alternate 4B with the same
mission profile as 4A but with an on-station time of 2
hours. This adds 12 missions per day to runs 9 and 10.
The effects of these four mission mixes are first,, to gradually increase
the number of RPVs that the launch and recovery equipment must handle each
day, and second, to add two extra missions that the MACS CGCS has to con-
trol with its total of eight beams. Figure 2 shows the total number of mis-
sions flown per day in each scenario under ideal conditions (no failures or
AV kills). Run 14 has double the number of missions as the first run. The
object is to determine the point at which system performance begins to de-
grade due to excessive workload.
In addition to the 14 baseline mission configurations described, a
number of excursion runs will be performed to examine the sensitivities of
MACS operational effectiveness criteria for various input parameters. For
example, there are excursions that examine the effects of adding a third
L&R set and a third CGCS to the MACS complex. The purpose is to investi-
gate methods of enhancing system performance. Therefore, the excursion rung
are based on outputs from the baseline runs. The excursions and their re-
sults are discussed in detail in Chapter III, after baseline results are
evaluated.
E. EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA
System effectiveness is evaluated in four categories. Three of these—
mission coverage, queueing delays, and RPV losses—are computer simulation
outputs; the fourth--relative operational and organizational (O&O) cost—is
a separate analysis and is discussed in Chapter IV. •
Mission Coverage; For TADAR missions, mission coverage is the per-
centage of time spent over the target area defined in the inputs. Two quan-
tities are calculated in the simulation. The first, called absolute mission
coverage, is the total time achieved over the target area by all TADAR RPV
missions, normalized to a single mission (divide by 4) and taken as a per-
centage of the total clock time. The second is relative mission coverage,
which is the same time-over-target value but taken as a percentage of the
net time that forward GCSs are emplaced and operational.
17
For other mission types, absolute coverage is calculated using time-
on-mission or time-on-station data, whichever is applicable. Relative
coverage is not calculated for missions controlled by the MACS, since at
least one CGCS is expected to be emplaced and operational at all times.
Queueing Delays; When the workload is. temporarily greater than a
piece of equipment can efficiently handle, queues develop that cause time
delays in delivering RPVs to their intended destination. These delays are
manifested as gaps in mission coverage. The program calculates the follow-
ing six queueing delays for insight into the source of degraded coverage
values for a particular mission configuration.
• RPV assignment: the time from generation of a mission request to
assignment of an AV to the MRF (time spent in AWAITING AV). If
this delay is long, the available base load is probably too
small.
• Launcher assignment: the time from completion of preflight pre-
paration to assignment of a launcher to the MRF (time spent in
AWAITING LAUNCHER). If long, the available launchers cannot effi-
ciently handle the launch load.
• Launch beam: the time an AV spends in the state ON LAUNCHER
AWAITING BEAM. A long delay here indicates the CGCS needs more
than eight beams to effectively control RPV operations.
• Handback beam: the time spent in AWAITING HANDBACK. If long, the
inference is the same as above but probably more severe, since a
returning RPV has highest priority.
• Net assignment: the time spent in AWAITING NET. If long enough
to approach the 15-minute reserve fuel limit, the potential for
losing RPVs increases.
• Overall launch delay: the total time from mission request to the
launch of an AV. This does not include expected time spent in
preflight preparation and prelaunch checkout. Whereas the pre-
vious five delays flag specific .areas of concern, this overall
quantity can indicate in general if low mission coverage is re-
lated more to operations at the MACS facility or equipment relia-
bility and enemy action.
RPV Losses; The third category of mission effectiveness criteria is
the total number of AVs lost for all reasons, which incl-ude enemy action,
running out of fuel, and a critical equipment or procedural failure while
the AV is in flight. The former would apply'only to missions that penetrate
the PLOT, i.e., TADAR, MTI, and Alternates 4A and 4B.
Relative OSO Cost; The discussion of this category (Chapter IV)
weighs mission performance benefits gained with certain mission configura-
tions against the relative cost of personnel and equipment required for
each.
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F. ASSUMPTIONS
The computer simulation is built around a number of assumptions that
describe how a MACS would operate in the field. Operational procedures and
equipment data that are currently available from the RPV program are incor-
porated. Since the MACS concept is still being developed, however, a por-
tion of this information is the result of engineering judgment on the part
of the RPV PM, RPV TSM, CACDA, JPL, CSTAL, and SPC.
This section contains a discussion of the assumptions used. They are
included if deemed significant to the logic of the simulation, i.e., pecu-
liar to MACs; a change from the current concept, though not necessarily
peculiar to MACS; or necessary for emphasis or clarification. Where appro-
priate, the discussion includes a justification or rationale behind the
assumption and how it is expected to affect the simulation. Whereas this
section is dedicated to procedures and operational logic, the next section
covers the actual input values used in computer runs.
1. Continuous Operations
The statement of work for this study calls for continuous mission cov-
erage as the desired mode for standard MACS operations, which includes all
TADAR, HS, RR, MTI, and alternate missions. This is the most stringent
operational condition and is unlikely for extended periods of time on the
battlefield. However, during surge situations, continuous coverage by any
or all of the missions above may be required for short periods. Conse-
quently, the simulation is structured to portray MACS at peak demand
levels.
Since the RPV system was designed to operate three 3-hour missions in
a 12-hour day (television package), simulating continuous mission coverage_
for a 24-hour day will cause many more equipment failures and lost AVs than
originally intended..The results section has a more specific discussion on
this topic.
2. RPV Priorities
When more than one RPV requires service at the same time, priorities
establish the order in which they are serviced. For the purposes of this
simulation, the system is assumed to be one in which TADAR missions are the
first priority activity. On the battlefield, such priorities are at the
discretion of the division commander and may be changed periodically to
suit specific objectives. The following list of RPV operational conditions
requiring service starts with the highest priority.
• RPV with lowest fuel requiring recovery net
• TADAR RPV with critical fuel level requiring handback beam
• TADAR RPV from displacing FGCS requiring handback beam
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• TADAR RPV requiring launcher
• Alternate RPV with continuous coverage specified requiring
launcher
• Hot spare requiring launcher
• Alternate RPV with noncontinuous coverage requiring launcher.
As an example, if an MTI RPV (i.e., continuous alternate) is in AWAIT-
ING LAUNCHER and a TADAR RPV destined to replace another -near the end of
its mission time enters the AWAITING LAUNCHER state also, the first avail-
able launcher will go to the TADAR AV. However, if the TADAR AV is to re-
place a hot spare nearing the end of its on-station time, the MTI AV would
get the launcher. Once on the launcher, an RPV will not be unloaded for one
with a higher priority.
3. MACS Control of Eight AVs
The MICNS data link is postulated to provide discrete addresses and a
time-division multiple-access (TDMA) structure for control of up to eight
AVs simultaneously. The simulation treats the MACS central facility as
having this capability as a maximum regardless of the number of CGCSs at
that facility. In theory, each CGCS would be able to control eight AVs by
itself. When two CGCSs are colocated and operational, their combined capa-
bilities presumably would represent control of up to 16 AVs at a time. It
is beyond the scope of this study to address the technical feasibility of
that condition ("e.g., frequency allocation for 16 discrete addresses from
the same facility); however, the operational considerations should still
constrain the number of AVs to eight.
First, the tactical commander would limit the total number of AVs in
the air under MACS control to the maximum that one CGCS could handle in the
event the other CGCS' failed. The operational ground station could then re-
gain control of all AVs without exceeding its own capacity. If only one
CGCS remained in operation and more than eight AVs were allowed in the air
at a time, the amount over eight would be lost.
Second, when the CGCSs must displace, there is Virtually no effect on
system operations, since the displacing ground station can hand control of
its AVs to the one remaining at the site. When the first CGCS is in place
and operational at the new location, it coordinates with the CGCS at the
old site to regain control of all current airborne RPVs before it dis-
places. If control of more than eight AVs were allowed between two CGCSs
when they were colocated, special procedures would need to be implemented
to recover the excess AVs when one displaces.
If a third CGCS is added to the MACS facility, one could argue that
the tactical commander would now allow 16 airborne AVs, since failure or
displacement of one ground station would still leave two others to handle
all the AVs. However, again putting aside the technical questions, this
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study assumes that the purpose behind including a third CGCS is to avoid
the catastrophic occurrence of one CGCS failing while the other is displac-
ing. Therefore, control of eight AVs is still the maximum allowed with
three CGCSs per facility. '
The simulation does not consider the .possibility that more than eight
AVs could be airborne under MACS responsibility if some were in a dead-
reckoning or "park and fly" mode, where direct control of those AVs does
not exist for a period of time. Periodic status updates would have to be
sent back to the CGCS in order to maintain a fix on the current AV posi-
tion. That would require an AV identification address for the GOT to com-
municate with the AV, just as with the other AVs under continuous control.
This is beyond the current capabilities of the MICNS data link, which
allows for eight discrete addresses.
4. CGCS Operations
Colocated CGCSs act as a single entity, exchanging data concerning
each other's activities and the status of all controlled AVs. The failure
or displacement of one results in immediate acquisition of its AVs by the
remaining operational stations. The probability of success for this type of
acquisition is assumed to be unity.
For the purposes of the simulation, CGCSs operating at separate loca-
tions but part of the same MACS platoon act as a single entity also. There-
fore, after one CGCS becomes newly emplaced and the second station is in
the process of displacing, it is assumed that the third still at the old
site can communicate with the first as if they were colocated. Clearly,
this is an idealized situation, since data communications between remote
ground stations would likely be less effective than communications via
cables between two that are col-ocated. However, data commonality between a
CGCS and a sister station at a distant location will be necessary if con-
tinuous operations are to be achieved, even with'two CGCSs.
If only one CGCS is operational and it fails, all airborne AVs under
its control are lost. With continuous operations, this type of catastrophic
failure will be unavoidable with only two ground stations per MACS complex.
A more complete discussion of this event and of the effect of the third
CGCS is contained in the results.
Within the MACS central facility, CGCSs are assumed to act relatively
independently of one another with respect to their associated launch and
recovery equipment. Therefore, if a CGCS fails, the L&R systems attached to
it become unavailable for use.
5. Displacement
The number of displacements per day for both the FGCSs and CGCSs are
specified in the input parameters. The simulation, however, handles this
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activity differently for the two kinds of ground stations. FGCS movements
are modeled stochastically, so that a particular FGCS could displace at any
time of day but would average the input number of moves per day over a long
period of time.. The probability of a move in any time period is modeled as
a geometric distribution with a specified mean time between moves. An FGCS
could potentially begin displacing within minutes after it completed a pre-
vious emplacement and then wait several days before moving again. Those
types of short and long time increments would be low probability events if
the mean time between displacements were, for example, 12 hours. The sto-
chastic model is more representative of a fluid battle situation, in which
regular moves for units close to the FLOT are more the exception than the
rule.
On the other hand, CGCS displacements are modeled deterministically,
with a fixed time increment between moves. This represents a more stable
condition for units far from the FLOT, whose movements are primarily de-
signed to stay one step ahead of the enemy's intelligence on current loca-
tions .
In both of the above cases, the simulation considers no warning of an
impending move prior to march orders being issued. The effect on the model
is that ground stations cannot schedule operations based on knowledge of an
upcoming move, though some advance notice may be available in a real situa-
tion. Operations are abruptly curtailed and redirected when a displacement
order is received so that teardown can commence as soon as is practical.
Teardown times used in the inputs, however, do reflect that forewarning
will be available to the sections to some degree.
TADAR AVs that are on station when an FGCS must displace are immedi-
ately put into a state awaiting a MACS beam for handback so the FGCS can be
free to commence teardown. This happens regardless of the time that AV has
already spent on station. AVs under-MACS control when a CGCS is told to
move are immediately transferred to another CGCS's control if one is avail-
able. Otherwise, a CGCS cannot displace until another station becomes
available (i.e., repairs are complete).
6. Utilization of MACS Beams
Aside from the items discussed under assumption paragraph 3, there are
several other guidelines for the use of the eight available beams per MACS
complex. The first time an MRF requires a beam is when prelaunch checkout
begins. The beam is then assigned to that mission throughout prelaunch,
launch, climbout, etc., until the AV is handed off to an FGCS, recovered,
or lost due to failure or enemy action. In actual RPV operations, the RGT
3See Assumptions paragraph 10 for fate of AVs that still have plenty
of fuel remaining when their associated FGCS aborts mission due to dis-
placement. '
• *
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beam is not required for the duration of prelaunch, but the MACS simulation
assumes that beams are not switched from mission to mission, even during
prelaunch. A TADAR mission being handed back from an FGCS is assigned a
beam for the remainder of its flight and recovery sequence.
Handovers of AVs are modeled differently depending -on whether a one-
way 'or two-way handover is being attempted. A one-way handoff or handback
(only one AV is involved) requires coordination between the CGCS and FGCS
throughout the procedure until the receiving party confirms positive con-
trol of its newly acquired RPV. One MACS beam is required for the duration
of the procedure. In a two-way handover, where the FGCS and CGCS are ex-
changing depleted and replacement TADAR mission AVs, the FGCS places its AV
in a dead-reckoning mode at the handover point, relinquishing control. The
FGCS then coordinates with the CGCS to assume positive control of the re-
placement AV. When the CGCS has completed transfer of AV control to the
FGCS, it then acquires the dead-reckoning AV to bring it back to recovery.
Again, only one MACS beam is required for the procedure. The coordination
between MACS and the FGCS is assumed to be sufficiently accurate and timely
that the CGCS's acquisition of the dead-reckoning AV has the same probabil-
ity of success as a positive control one-way handover. No time delays for
data link reacquisition are included.
If the replacement AV is late in arriving, such that the mission AV is
too low on fuel to remain on station any longer, the FGCS will begin AV
transit under its control back toward the recovery area. If the replacement
AV reaches the mission .area before the returning AV reaches the recovery
area, handoff and handback will commence at those separate points as de-
scribed above. The CGCS acquires the returning AV en route, wherever it
happens to be.
If the replacement AV*is very late in arriving (due to excessive de-
lays in launching), such that the returning AV reaches the recovery area
under FGCS control, the latter AV is placed in orbit at the recovery site,
awaiting a MACS beam for recovery. Meanwhile, the FGCS acquires the out-
bound AV en route to the mission area. Other instances where the FGCS will
acquire an outbound AV before it reaches the standard handoff area are
after the FGCS is freshly emplaced or after it has lost an AV; in other
words, when the FGCS has no AV to exchange. This procedure frees up a MACS
beam several minutes earlier than normal, allowing it to be used elsewhere.
Replacement of AVs that are always under CGCS control does not involve
handover. Therefore, two MACS beams are required during the replacement
procedure—one to control the on-station AV at all times, and the other to
direct the transit of the replacement AV to and from the station point.
Note how this use of dead reckoning differs from that prohibited by
the discussion in Assumption paragraph 3.
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7. Mission Payloads
For the purposes of the simulation, all TADAR mission payloads are
assumed to be of the same kind, which implies FLIR packages, since day and
night operations are conducted. In practice, RPV,platoons will likely use a
mix of FLIR and television (TV) payloa'ds to perform TADAR missions. This
study does not address how such a mix would affect AV base load quantities
or TADAR mission performance.
Pay loads are interchangeable; that is, a TADAR, Mil, RR, or any alter-
nate payload can be installed in the standard Aquila airframe and exchanged
with any other payload as needed. As advanced payloads are developed for
the RPV system, design efforts focus on modular payloads so that the number
of total AVs in the CL&R section base load can be minimized. Currently, the
interchange times are long enough (see inputs) that such a reduction in
base load may not yet be realized, because frequent payload interchange
could cause unacceptable delays in filling mission requests. The simulation
is structured to accept an interchange action, but only as a last resort.
8. Base Load
In view of the preceding discussion, the base load for the MACS CL&R
section is designed so that interchanging payloads in AVs will rarely be
required. One of the primary assumptions in determining base load size was
that enough of each type of RPV must be on hand to supply the section when
it is depleted because of AV loss and is expecting resupply and when one
CGCS must displace, taking half the available base load with it. Since the
simultanequs occurrence of those circumstances is relatively uncommon, they
define a base load size that should be adequate except under very infre-
quent conditions (e.g., failure of the only operating CGCS with a resultant
loss of up to eight AVs).
The size of the base load is also determined by the method in which
AVs are transported by the CL&R section. In the current RPV O&O concept
[Ref. 3] / three AVs are carried on each air vehicle cargo truck and two AVs
on each AV handler. Those quantities are constrained by the size of RPV
shipping crates, whose dimensions are in turp dictated by handling and
packaging specifications. It is not expected that the crates will be made
smaller to accommodate more AVs per truck. Therefore, the total number of
AVs carried per MACS complex must fit the equation 2H + 3C, where H is the
number of air vehicle handlers and C is the number of air vehicle cargo
trucks. For a MACS with two L&R units (two AV handlers), the possible base
load sizes are 4 + 3C, or 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, etc. With three L&R units,
the allowed number of AVs is 6 + 3C, or 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, etc. The num-
ber of each type of RPV (TADAR, MTI, etc.) must in turn satisfy the indi-
vidual requirements of the different missions. See Chapter III for numbers
of RPVs by type for each mission set run in the simulation. The inputs sec-
tion also has an example calculation of base load for a specific mission
mix.
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When CGCSs displace, the rule determining how the base load is split
between them is that the number of AVs of each type that is available
(i.e., not assigned to an MRF) in the base load at the time of displacement
is divided by the number of CGCSs; if the dividend is a whole number, the
departing CGCS takes that quantity; if a fraction, it takes the next higher
whole number of RPVs. For example, from .a total base load of 16 TADAR AVs,
5 of which may be airborne or otherwise assigned to an active MRF, and 2 of
which may have been lost to enemy action, a total of 9 AVs is available in
the base load when one of the two CGCSs must displace. It takes five AVs
with it. As another example, suppose the total base load and current as-
signments for a MACS with three CGCSs is broken out as follows:
AV
Type
TADAR
MTI
RR
Alternate #3
Total in
Base Load
14
4
3
3
24
Number
Currently
Assigned
6
1
2
1
Number Lost
Until Next
Resupply
1
0
0
0
Number
Available
on Ground
7
3
1
2
The displacing CGCS would take one-third of the available number, or three
TADAR AVs, one MTI, one RR, and one Alternate 3.
9. Resupply
Neither the criteria for initiating air vehicle resupply nor the proc-
ess for accomplishing it have yet been determined for the current RPV CL&R
concept. An earlier SPC report [Ref. 2] postulated the mechanisms and time-
lines involved. Though not approved, the SPC timelines have been recom-
mended by the RPV TSM as acceptable speculations at this time.
Briefly summarizing the referenced report, resupply will be accom-
plished in the following manner: when three AVs have been lost due to
equipment failure, enemy action, or running out of fuel, one AV truck is
free of cargo. The empty truck is dispatched, with a driver and assistant,
to the AV supply point to exchange the three empty AV containers for full
ones. The supply point has not been determined, but is assumed at DISCOM.
After getting his load of AVs, the driver will make his way back towards
the CL&R section. Since the section will almost certainly have moved since
his departure hours ago, the driver must find the new location. The whole
process is likely to take several hours because of slow travel times on
wartime roads. The aspects of this procedure that are pertinent in the sim-
ulation are that resupply is triggered by the loss of three AVs of any
type, takes a fixed amount of time dictated by distance to the supply point
.(see inputs), and is always delivered to the most recently emplaced CGCS in
the same proportions as were lost. For example, if two TADAR AVs are lost
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to enemy fire and one MTI AV crashes when it fails in flight, the same com-
bination of payloads in AVs will be delivered upon resupply.
The resupply mechanism for payload packages independent of air vehi-
cles is not considered in the simulation. Payloads are supplied in air
vehicles on a one-for-one basis to those lost, and if s-pares or parts are
needed for any reason, there is extra room in the AV cargo truck to bring
back those items from DISCOM after its three new AV crates have been
loaded.
Finally, the simmlation considers the supply of AVs and payloads at
the supply point to be unlimited. Clearly, the number of AVs and payloads
planned in the total RPV procurement will dictate how many each supply
depot can store (or conversely, the expected rate of wartime AV losses will
be a factor in calculating procurement quantities), but delays in resupply
due to shortages at the supply point are not modeled here.
10. Hot Spares
Hot spares are intended to replace TADAR missions that are aborted due
to AV failure, payload failure, or AV kill. Their purpose is to reduce the
replacement time to minutes rather than the hour or so it takes to generate
a new mission request, prepare the AV, launch and transit it to the mission
area. It is assumed that hot spares are not for replacing TADAR missions
that are nearing time to return for recovery, nor for filling new mission
requests generated by a freshly emplaced FGCS. Other mechanisms are de-
signed for those purposes.
For mission sets that specify use of the HS, the simulation assumes
one HS to be continuously on station. There are instances where more than
one HS may be on station at the same time. That happens when an FGCS is
given notice to displace and its mission AV has been on station only a
short time. The AV is sent to the HS orbit point instead of being sent back
for recovery. If it is not used before its fuel gets to a predetermined
level, the AV returns to the CL&R site. In- this way, the aborted mission
AVs can potentially be used more efficiently.
Chances are the type of HS described above will rarely be used when
the probability of TADAR AV survival is high and an HS is continuously on
station anyway. TADAR mission AVs will be killed relatively infrequently;
when one is, there should nearly always be a standard HS on station to re-
place it. However,- if the survival probability were low, this "abort" HS
procedure will alleviate the load on the standard HSs.
11. Initialization
At the beginning of each computer run, operations are set in motion
through a series of actions that loosely emulate how a MACS platoon might
begin operations from scratch. During the first time increment, one CGCS
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and one FGCS are considered newly emplaced. The CGCS has its attached L&R
equipment and is ready for operations with the entire specified base load
of AVs. The FGCS requests its first mission, and the CGCS complies. Each
half-hour thereafter, the other FGCSs emplace one by one and request their
first mission until all four FGCSs are operating.
Meanwhile, the second CGCS emplaces some time after the first, equal
to the time one CGCS would take to tear down, move, and become operational
(see inputs). The third CGCS will emplace the same amount of time after the
second.
When other missions besides TADAR are included in the run, they are
also launched during the first 2 hours as the TADAR missions are being
serviced. Figure 3 shows when the GCS emplacements, requests, and launches
occur for the first of each mission type in a fully loaded scenario (i.e.,
all payloads being played). Mission requests are scheduled 15 minutes apart
to allow ample time for one launcher to.handle AV loading, prelaunch check-
out, and launch without incurring delays over many successive launches (un-
less the equipment fails).
GROUND STATION
EMPLACEMENTS
CGCS #1
FGCS #1
FGCS #2
FGCS #3
FGCS #4
CGCS #2
(TIME BASED
ON INPUTS)
60<
90<
120
150 -
TIME (min)
MISSION
REQUESTS
TADAR #1
RR
TADAR #2
MTI
TADAR #3
ALTERNATE 3
TADAR #4
ALTERNATE 4
HS
LAUNCHES
(APPROXIMATE
TIMES)
ALTERNATE 4
5SV;
Figure 3. Initialization of MACS Operations
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After about 2-1/2 hours, all CGCSs and FGCSs are emplaced (if two
CGCSs are played) and all possible missions are airborne. Normal continuous
operations are in effect, with missions regenerating themselves. Transient
effects resulting from this initialization period should be negligible if
the simulation is run long enough.
12. Mission Planning
It is assumed that all activities concerning mission planning at both
the broad level (e.g., what type of mission is required, where is coverage
needed most) and the detailed level (e.g., flight profile parameters and
waypoints) can be performed concurrently with other activities in prepara-
tion for a mission. Therefore, mission planning timelines do not impact
mission performances achieved in the simulation, except for the first mis-
sion after FGCS or CGCS emplacement, as discussed in paragraph G.4.
G. INPUTS
This section lists and discusses the specific input parameters and
their values for the baseline runs. There are two types of inputs: those
that remain constant for all baseline runs and those that change and form
the distinguishing features of the baseline outputs. The values associated
with the latter type are given on a case-by-case basis in Chapter III, s*",^
where inputs for excursion runs are also discussed. 5"
*>1. Equipment Reliability £. •-;
i
The RPV Required Operational Capability (ROC) [Ref. 4] and Prime Item
Development Specification (PIDS) [Ref. 5] list reliability minimum accept-
able values (MAVs) for each- major subsystem of the original RPV system.
These numbers are used for all MACS baseline runs. Excursion runs will ex- *
amine the effects of using a set of updated reliability numbers expected by *
the contractor to more accurately represent system performance (see Chapter .
 x
III).
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The simulation incorporates the reliability figures as a constant
probability of failure during each time interval that a particular piece of
equipment is in operation. The values are as follows:
• GCS: FGCSs and CGCSs are considered equivalent with respect to
reliability. The PIDS states that the GCS and GDT shall have a
combined MAV of 0.92 of completing 10 hours of continual opera-
tion without a mission-affecting failure. The rate applies here ~
to either type of MACS ground station while it is emplaced and
operational. FGCS failure will cause the loss of an AV under its
control at the time. CGCS failure will cause transfer of airborne
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AVs to an operational CGCS, or loss of all AVs under its control
if no operational CGCS is available.
Mission payload:. All RPV payloads for MACS are assumed to have
the same reliability. In practice, some will be simpler than
others and less likely to break down. Since values do not exist
for advanced payloads still in the conceptual phases of design,
reliability numbers for the TADAR television payload are used for
all mission payload types. The ROC specifies a mean time between
failure (MTBF) of 150 hours, which applies to all payload inde-
pendent failures that would cause a mission abort while the AV is r
airborne. Therefore, a payload could fail during AV climbout, but
it may not become apparent to the GCS operators until the AV is
on station and commanded to perform. At that point, it would be
sent back and a new MRF generated. Failures while not airborne
are not considered. 5
AV: The PIDS states that the AV, less mission payload, shall
have an MAV of 0.98 of completing 3 hours of continual operation
without a mission-affecting failure. This only applies while the
AV is airborne, so a failure results in an AV loss.
Launcher: The PIDS specifies an MAV of 0.99 of completing a
 fr
launch without a mission-affecting failure. This reliability is
assumed to apply over a period of 27 minutes, which is the time 1<:
provided by Lockheed to complete one full cycle of setup, launch, S
and teardown. In the simulation, launcher failure is only pos-
sible during the prelaunch checkout and awaiting launch beam O*
phases (since "launch" is a zero-time event) and only when the <_<-""
CGCS to which the launcher is attached is emplaced and operating. '.
Launcher failures do not cause AV losses. <x*~
!>
Recovery subsystem: The PIDS specifies an MAV of 0.99 of com- ""£
pleting a recovery without a failure that would prevent the sub-
system from being recycled for use within 5 minutes- (in case of a
recovery abort and go-around). This number is taken literally as t
meaning out of every 100 recovery attempts, the recovery subsys- 'f
tern will fail once. It does not result in an AV loss, however. If t *•
the recovery net can be erected, an RPV can be recovered (pro-
vided that the GCS or AV does not fail during recovery) . A fail-
 t ^
ure in the infrared recovery guidance mechanism on the net will »
be detected by the AV, and it can go around for a try on the
other net. Alternatively, an AV can be guided into the net by the
AV operator using its own television mission payload as a viewer. r
In the simulation, the recovery subsystem can fail any time
during the recovery attempt, resulting in a successful recovery
and an inoperable net requiring maintenance.
The program converts all reliability numbers into MTBFs.
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2. Equipment Maintainability
The ROC specifies that the RPV system be designed so that 90 percent
of all failures can be detected and corrected by technicians at the section
level with a mean time to repair (MTTR) of 30 minutes. The remaining 10
percent of the failures require repairs by a technician from the general
support maintenance unit with an MTTR of 2 hours. These numbers are used in
the baseline runs for all MACS equipment repairs. Revised maintainability
numbers will be examined in excursion runs.
The details of how general support maintenance will be provided have
not yet been decided. One proposal is that contact teams will respond to
calls from the RPV sections. In a battle situation, the division general
support maintenance could be expected to provide a contact team to the RPV
sections supporting the division in a reasonably short period of time. In
this study, it is assumed that maintenance teams will respond to the CL&R
section in 1 hour. Response by the brigade support teams to the operations
sections will also be 1 hour. These travel or response times are added to
the repair times for a total MTTR of 3 hours when general support mainte-
nance is involved.
3. Displacement Intervals
FGCSs and CGCSs both are assumed to displace twice per 24-hour period
on the average, as recommended for this study by the RPV TSM. FGCS move-
ments are stochastically determined while CGCSs will move every 12 hours,
as explained in the assumptions.
4. Displace/Travel/Emplace Timelines
The O&O concept for RPV operations with independent sections (i.e.,
no CL&R facility) describes timelines for displacement and emplacement
activities of the ground complex. Teardown should be achieved in 30 min-
utes, and emplacement at the new site should be completed in 60 minutes.
In the MACS concept, forward and rear ground stations have different
equipment and responsibilities than in tbe original concept, thus timelines
are also different. The forward operations sections are far less complex
without launch and recovery equipment, an air vehicle handler, and mainte-
nance shelter. Teardown is assumed by the authors to be only 15 minutes.
Emplacement is decreased to 45 minutes to reflect less equipment duties but
retain the relatively long mission planning responsibilities to prepare for
the first mission at the new site. Add to these times half an hour for
travel time within the brigade area, for a total of 1-1/2 hours for the
forward sections. .This does not take into account the displacement timeline
of the forward division element being supported by the RPV section, which
may dictate RPV movement times more than activities within the section
itself.
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The CL&R complex has much the same equipment as in the original RPV
sections, but is not assumed in this study to have the responsibility to do
detailed mission planning upon emplacement. Its mission planning may con-
sist of selecting several way points for climbout and transit routes, which
could become somewhat standardized within a division. Teardown is assumed
to remain at 30'minutes and emplacement 'to be decreased to 30 minutes. Add
travel time of 1 hour to a new site in the rear division area for a total
of 2 hours for CL&R sections. An excursion with longer timelines is de-
scribed in Chapter III.
5. Probability of Survival
Only AVs that penetrate the PLOT (those on TADAR, MTI, and Alternate 4
missions) are exposed to enemy fire and subject to being killed. In view of
the most recent RPV survivability studies (e.g., Ref. 6), the RPV TSM rec-
ommended using in the simulation a probability of survival of 0.95 for
TADAR missions. Since the other missions mentioned are at a higher alti-
tude, out of range of the most numerous and threatening enemy weapons, a
value of 0.97 was recommended for those mission survivability rates.
This will cause a dramatic reduction in the number of AVs lost during
continuous operations when compared to the survival probability of 0.75
used in previous RPV studies. Now, 1 in 20 missions will lose an AV to
enemy action instead of 1 in 4. Excursion runs will examine the effects of
AV survivability and compare with baseline results.
6. AV Transit Speeds
During transit out to'the mission area, AVs are assumed to fly 150
kilometers per hour, whether in level flight or climbing while transiting.
The return trip to the recovery area is flown at 130 kilometers per hour to
account for AV descent at low engine speeds once the FLOT is crossed. Speed
while on mission is not a factor, since time on mission is determined by
minutes of fuel available.
7. Rate of Climb
AV climb rates provided by the RPV PM office vary according to the en-
vironmental conditions and AV weight, which varies among different payload
packages and decreases as fuel is expended during a mission. Since climbout
usually takes place at the beginning of a mission when the fuel level is
high, a "heavy-AV" climbout rate was chosen. The fixed rate used for all
AVs in the simulation is 250 feet per minute, which is at the high end of
the PM estimate for a heavy AV at an altitude of 4,000 feet on a 95-degree
day.
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8 . MACS-to-FLOT Distance
Baseline runs have the MACS complex located 35 kilometers from the
FLOT. The principal effects of this distance on the simulation are re-
fleeted in the time for resupply to be accomplished, the time for general
support maintenance' teams to travel to- the section, the number of times the
central facility must displace to confuse enemy location techniques, and
possibly the amount of time from AV launch to arrival on station. These ef-
fects are examined in more detail in excursion runs and are discussed in
Chapter III. Ground station vulnerability is also affected by this dis-
tance, but is not considered in the simulation.
9. AV Cargo Truck Capacity
The nominal number of AVs that can be carried on a 5 -ton cargo truck
is three, as discussed previously. This number was made an input to the
simulation to allow the flexibility to examine the effect of increasing the
load per truck. However, in conversations with the RPV PM office, this pos-
sibility was discounted due to handling and shipping constraints that will
not allow for any significant reduction in the size of AV shipping crates
used now. Furthermore, the increased AV survivability rates recommended for
this study probably minimize any anticipated benefits of a larger resupply
load, and may in fact show a larger load to be detrimental to mission cov-
erages while waiting for a resupply truck to become empty. Therefore, no
excursions concerning this topic are included.
1 0. Resupply Time
Previous SPC studies have estimated AV resupply to an RPV CL&R section
to take 6 to 10 hours using a, supply point in the rear division area. Con-
versations with the RPV TSM indicate this estimate is still supported. In
the belief that an optimal procedure will be developed for this critical
action, this study uses a fixed resupply time of 6 hours. Excursions will
examine the effect of faster and slower times on mission performance.
1 1. Scheduled Activities
Several stages of a typical RPV mission have fixed timelines within a
computer run, each specified by an input.
• Pref light preparation: This includes the time to check out the
AV at the maintenance shelter, fuel it, and transport it to the
various stations within the ground complex. AVs are assumed re-
moved from their storage containers concurrently with other em-
placement activities, and therefore it is not part of the pre-
f light timeline. Preparation will vary with each AV; for example,
an AV just recovered may not need to undergo checkout at the
maintenance shelter under all circumstances. The simulation as-
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sumes that RPVs will be maintained in a "ready" state to some
degree, so that when a mission is requested, only 5 additional
minutes will be required to prepare the AV before loading on the
launcher. For the most part, a longer preparation time would go
unnoticed because mission requests would simply be generated
earlier to allow for the extra preparation time.
Load launcher: It is assumed that under normal circumstances
when the launcher workload is not heavy, forewarning of the next
mission will be available to some degree. This will have the ef-
fect of the AV being ready early on the launcher. The simulation
treats this as a load time of 0 minutes (or equivalently, a re-
duced preparation timeline plus 3 minutes to load) under those
conditions. When the launcher workload is such that a queue has
developed and one AV after another must be launched in succes-
sion, a load time of 3 minutes is included after a launch and be-
fore the next prelaunch checkout can begin.
Prelaunch checkout: This is assumed to take 9 minutes, per the
RPV PM, once the AV is loaded and engine started. For the simula-
tion, it requires the full-time use of a CGCS beam. Prelaunch
checkout concludes with a lauuch, which takes no time.
Handover: It is expected that since handoffs and handbacks will
become routine procedures for the current RPV CLSR concept as
well as MACS, each will have a high probability of success
(0.995) and take little time to coordinate and accomplish (2 min-
utes). A two-way handover consists of two 0.995 probability of
success events, using a total of 2 minutes. An unsuccessful hand-
over event is assumed to result in a lost AV.
Recovery: The recovery sequence uses a total of 7 minutes. This
is the time the recovery subsystem is dedicated to a single re-
covery event, including AV approach flight, retrieval from the
net, and erecti'on of the net for the next event.
Payload interchange and installation: The time for these proce-
dures varies with type of payloads involved. For example, current
estimates are that removing 'a television payload and installing a
FLIR may take 90 minutes, but removing the TV and installing a
simple dispensor payload could only be half that time. The RPV PM
office recommended average times of 60 minutes for interchange
and 45 minutes for installation of a payload into an empty AV.
12. TAbAR Mission Parameters
The following parameters determine the amount of time a TADAR mission
AV will spend in the various stages of its mission.
• Mission area begins 10 kilometers beyond"the PLOT. For the pur-
poses of the simulation, this is where handovers are assumed to
occur and the point at which TADAR AVs are considered performing
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their mission. The location for handover was chosen to facilitate
maximum mission coverages and without regard to survivability. In
practice, RPVs are more vulnerable while in a stationary orbit
and would probably not be handed off over enemy territory. For
the model, the location of handover does not significantly affect
the results. .
On-station altitude is 2,000 meters. This is actually the alti-
tude at which the simulation has a TADAR AV crossing the PLOT and
transiting to the mission area. Fluctuations in altitude once in
the mission area are not pertinent to time on station.
TADAR fuel capacity is 180 "minutes." Fuel is deducted each time
increment as a convenient way to track an AV's time until it must
be recovered. Reserves add another 15 minutes of fuel to any
stated AV capacity.
TADAR fuel to return is 30 minutes. When the fuel reaches this
level, it signals the simulation to immediately take the AV off
station and bring it home. The 30 minutes includes 2 minutes for
handback, 21 minutes to fly 45 kilometers to the recovery area at
130 kilometers per hour, and 7 minutes recovery time. Delays in
awaiting a handback beam or at the recovery net will cut into the
15 minutes of fuel reserve. A similar value is calculated for
each AV mission type.
TADAR fuel level at which a mission request is generated for a
replacement AV is 83 minutes. This includes 5 minutes for pre-
flight preparation of the replacement AV, 3 minutes for launcher
loading, 9 minutes prelaunch checkout, 13 minutes in climbout (to
950 meters altitude at 75 meters per minute), 14 minutes in
climbout while transiting (at 150 kilometers per hour, climbing
to 2,000 meters altitude at the FLOT), 4 minutes in transit to
the mission area, and a 5-minute buffer time. If no delays are
encountered, the replacement AV will arrive at the handover site
5 minutes before the mission AV reaches its fuel level to return.
13. Hot Spare Mission Parameters
When the HS is played, its required mission is continuous on-station,
with the following mission parameters.
• On-station position is 10 kilometers on the friendly side of the
FLOT.- Therefore, it will take an HS 8 minutes to travel the 20
kilometers to replace a TADAR mission AV.
• On-station altitude is 1,700 meters. This allows the HS to climb
to 2,000 meters while transiting the 10 kilometers to the FLOT
when called.
• HS fuel capacity is 180 minutes, as with TADAR AVs.
34
HS fuel to return is 67 minutes. This is dictated by a 90-minute
on-station time, following a 13-minute climbout and 10-minute
transit while climbing. Therefore, as a worst case, an HS could
have 68 minutes of fuel remaining when called, transit 8 minutes
to the TADAR mission area, leaving 60 minutes — 30 of which are
required to get -home . '
HS fuel level to generate a replacement HS is 107 minutes. This
includes time for preparation (5), loading launcher (3), pre-
launch (9), climbout (13), and transit (10)' of the new HS before
the old one must return (67).
14. RR and Alternates 3A and 3B Mission Parameters
These missions have the same orbit points, but differ with respect to
payload, on-station time, request frequency, and the fuel-level flag to
generate the next MRF.
• On-station position is 10 kilometers on the friendly side of the
PLOT.
• On-station altitude is 3,048 meters.
• Fuel capacity is dictated by on-station times for the three mis-
sions, which are 5 hours for the RR, 5 hours for Alternate 3A,
and 3 hours for Alternate 3B. Add times for climbout (31 min-
utes), transit out while climbing (10), transit back (12), and
recovery (7) to arrive at fuel allotted.
• Fuel to return is 19 minutes for all three mission types. It in-
cludes transit back and recovery.
• Fuel level to generate next mission is 87 minutes for all three
mission types. The breakout is preparation (5), load (3), pre-
launch (9), climbout (31), transit out while climbing (10), and a
buffer (10) before the AV must return (19).
1 5. MTI and Alternates 4A and 4B Mission Parameters
These missions also differ with respect to payload, on-station time,
request frequency, and the fuel-level flag to generate the next MRF.
• On-station position begins 10 kilometers on the enemy side of the
FLOT. Missions may penetrate further, though the simulation does
not play that feature.
• On-station altitude is 3,048 meters. However, these AVs are con-
sidered to cross the FLOT at 2,748 meters and continue climbing
the extra 300 meters to station altitude while over enemy terri-
tory.
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• Fuel capacity is again driven by on-station times of 3 hours for
MTI, 3 hours for Alternate 4A, and 2 hours for Alternate 4B. Add
times for climbout (23), transit while climbing (18), transit
back (21), and recovery (7) for total fuel capacity.
• Fuel to return is for. transit back and recovery, a total of 28
minutes for each of the three missions.
• The appropriate fuel flag for the replacement mission is 96 min-
utes in each case. The breakout is the same as in paragraph 14,
with the extra 9 minutes due to the larger fuel to return value.
1 6. Base Load Quantities
The quantity of AVs in the base load was estimated for each mission
set by considering the number of continuous missions airborne, the average
number of AVs at any instant in time that are 'assigned to an MRF but not
actually on mission, the frequency of AV losses, the resupply mechanism,
and the effect of a displacing CGCS taking its share of the base load. One
example should serve to illustrate the kind of analyses performed for each
computer run to arrive at a reasonable base load configuration. In Chapter
III, excursions are discussed that test the validity of these manual analy-
ses.
Consider baseline run number 12, which has two each CGCSs, launchers,
and recovery nets, and whose missions include TADAR, HS, RR, MTI, and
Alternates 3B and 4A. There will be five missions that require TADAR pay-
loads on station at all times: four FGCS mission AVs plus the HS. Also,
during about 75 percent of the TADAR and HS on-station* hours actually
achieved in a continuous coverage mode, two RPVs are airborne or otherwise
assigned to each TADAR or HS mission. The second AV is either in transit
between the CL&R site and mission area or in some phase of preparation
before being launched. This means there will be an average of nine AVs in
use at all times to cover the five TADAR-payload missions.
Now consider displacements. When one CGCS moves, it will take half of
the available (i.e., not assigned to any MRF) base load. If the TADAR base
load were nine, the chances of all nine being already assigned when dis-
placement time comes are something less than 75 percent (by the foregoing
arguments). The chances of eight or more being assigned are very high (near
certainty) which would leave one unassigned AV. By the rules described ear-
lier, the displacing CGCS would take it, leaving eight in the operating
base load of the remaining CGCS. we already know eight is not enough to run
five missions continuously without incurring delays.
If the total TADAR base load were 10, and 8 were assigned, the dis-
placing CGCS would take 1 of the 2 available AVs. The remaining AV together
with the eight being used would be marginally enough to sustain operations
if no equipment failures occur.
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This scenario must also be viable when RPVs are lost and resupply is
forthcoming. Therefore, when 3 AVs have been killed and the resupply truck
is out, 10 total TADAR AVs must still be in the usable base load at the
complex.. When all is considered then, the minimum AV base load to sustain
TADAR operations at four FGGSs under standard conditions appears-to be 13.
The base load £or the other types of mission AVs can be likewise ana-
lyzed to arrive at three RRs (one up, one replacement, and one for dis-
placement contingency), three MTIs, three Alternate 3Bs, and three Alter-
nate 4As as minimums. Adding up all AVs gives 25 as a lower bound. From
previous discussions in Assumption paragraph 8, we know the total has to
fit 4 + 3C. Thus, 25 AVs is the correct amount in the base load for this
run.
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III. BASELINE RESULTS AND EXCURSIONS
A. BASELINE RESULTS
This section presents the results of computer runs for the baseline
mission sets. Before giving the details of the 14 runs, discussions are ap-
propriate of how many missions are enough to dampen out probabilistic ef-
fects and what general trends in the simulation results can be intuitively
anticipated.
1 . Simulation Covergence
As the model was being developed and as the first runs were being made
in the debugging process, criteria were established by the programmers to
ensure that enough missions would be generated during each run to minimize
probabilistic effects. In particular, events that occur infrequently but
with consequences that influence the overall results should be allowed to
occur at least once each run for a valid comparison between runs. For exam-
ple, the failure of a CGCS while all other CGCSs are inoperable (displacing
or being repaired) would appear to be of sufficient consequence that it
should happen each run in order to have a basis of comparison. In plan-
ning, therefore, runs were designed' to be long enough to include all such
foreseeable events. *
The primary criterion established to test convergence was that the
mission coverages achieved by the four forward operational sections show no
more than a specified percentage spread. The four FGCSs are identical with
respect to how they are serviced by the MACS central facility. There are no
distinguishing features built into the model that should cause one FGCS to
achieve a high coverage while another suffers low coverage. The only cause
for differences in FGCS coverages is the stochastic nature of FGCS dis-
placements, equipment failures, repair timelines, and enemy kills of on-
station AVs. These effects are minimized by requiring the difference be-
tween the highest and lowest FGCS coverages to be less than 5 percent. The
stated TADAR coverage achieved for each computer run is the mean of the
four individual coverages.
11n fact, the consequences of such a failure are not critical enough
to alter the overall conclusions of this study. However, several RPVs,
each costing '$0.5 million, .are lost with each occurrence, so'that efforts
to avoid failure would be worthwhile.
Preceding page blank •
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The 5-percent spread is chosen in view of the very large amount of
computer time that would be necessary to reduce the spread to an even
smaller value, such as 2 or 1 percent. To achieve the 5-percent goal, each
run simulates MACS operations minute by minute over a 20-day period. Almost
30,000 cycles of the main program are processed each run, which generates
between 1,000 and 2,000'RPV mission requests, depending on the mission set
being -analyzed in the run. About 70 to 80 percent of those mission requests
result in missions flown. The 20-day runs produce clear trends in the major
effectiveness criteria discussed in Chapter II when comparing results of
runs with different mission sets. To achieve the smaller coverage spreads
mentioned previously would not only require two to three times the computer
resources, but would only slightly increase confidence in the validity of
the overall conclusions.
2. General Results
Before the computer analyses were completed, a "back-of-the-envelope"
analysis was performed to anticipate the kind of outputs that would be gen-
erated by the simulation and also to assist in detecting unexpected results
during the debugging process that might indicate errors in program logic.
Several outcomes of that less rigorous analysis are discussed here to show
what can be expected from the simulation.
a. Maximum Expected TADAR Coverage
After an FGCS tears down, moves to a new location, and sets up opera-
tions again, it calls for a new mission. Since hot spares are assumed not
to be allocated for servicing newly emplaced FGCSs, the mission request is
processed -at the MACS facility and a new AV arrives on station approximate-
ly 45 minutes later. FGCSs displace* twice per day on the average, so there
are 90 minutes each day when an FGCS is operational but receives no cover-
age. In addition, handovers take 2 minutes, during which neither AV is per-
forming a mission. One FGCS should conduct about 10 missions in a 21-hour
operational day (3 hours are for displacements) with 10 associated handover
events for a total of 20 more minutes without coverage. Because of the
mechanisms described, 110 minutes in each 20-hour operational day are with-
out coverage at ea.ch forward section. Even if no equipment failures occur-
red , the maximum relative coverage attainable for TADAR missions would
therefore be about 91 percent; the corresponding maximum absolute coverage
would be about 80 percen't.
When expected failures of the AV, mission payload, and FGCS itself are
considered, along with expected kills of TADAR mission AVs, additional gaps
in mission coverage are caused because of the time to replace failed or
lost items. Based on reliability and survivability inputs stated in Chapter
II. the additional daily failures and AV kills should reduce TADAR cover-
ages another 3 to 5 percent, bringing maximum relative coverage to between
86 and 88 percent and absolute coverage about 10 percent lower than that.
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Actual TADAR coverages from computer outputs will be degraded from the
above values in accordance with the input values of two parameters: how
many missions of all types must be processed by ground facilities and how
many different types of RPV missions must be controlled by the MACS an-
tenna. As the total number of missions increases, launch operations will
develop longer servicing queues, resulting in increased delays for a larger
percentage of missions, and reducing coverage. Also, as mission types
(e.g., HS, RR, MTI) are added to the RPV fleet, the MACS antenna will be
using its eight beams almost continuously, resulting in delays in receiving
a beam for AVs on the launcher and AVs awaiting handback. Coverage will
again decrease. Therefore, assuming the base load of RPVs is sufficient to
supply the needs of the section (and we have designed it to be so), TADAR
mission coverages less than 86 percent should be accompanied by launcher
and beam delays in proportion (though not necessarily linearly) to the
amount below the 86 percent mark.
b. MACS Beam Allocation
An estimation can be made of the number of beams required to sustain
continuous operations of any particular mission set. As an example, con-
sider the fully loaded set, with HS, RR, MTI, and Alternates 3B and .48.
There are five missions besides the standard TADAR mission that must be
continuously supported by MACS. The discussion in Chapter II, section G.16
pointed out that in order to sustain continuous operations of the four
FGCSs and the HS, an additional four TADAR AVs will be in use at all times,
either in transit, recovery, prelaunch checkout, or preparation. Of those
four AVs, three will require full-time use of a MACS beam, on the average.
Similarly, additional RPVs are needed to sustain the continuous operations
of the other four mission types, namely RR, MTI, and Alternates 3B and 4B.
That requires about one-half of an AV per mission, or two more AVs total.
Thus the breakout of AVs under MACS control at all times is:
5 mission AVs (HS, RR, MTI, 3B, 4B)
3 TADAR support AVs (including HS)
2 support AVs for other 4 missions
10 total
MACS will need to control 10 AVs at a time to comfortably handle (i.e.,
without excessive delays) the fully loaded mission scenario.
If only the HS, RR, and MTI missions are flown with the basic TADAR
mission, the breakout is:
3 mission AVs
3 TADAR support AVs
_1_ support AV for other 2 missions
7 total
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It appears that eight beams should handle a mission set somewhere between
the two examples illustrated.
c. AV Losses
Continuous RPV operation is the single most important element that
drives the general results of the computer runs. As an example, the previ-
ously studied standard concept for a TADAR RPV section calls for three 3-
hour flights per day, which allows for about 6 hours of coverage over the
target area in a 24-hour period. Continuous operations require roughly
twelve 2-hour periods of coverage back-to-back in 24 hours. On the average,
four times as many RPVs are exposed to enemy action in continuous opera-
tions compared to the standard concept, so AV kills should be four times as
high.
Launch and recovery equipment will be operating four times as often,
with proportionate increases in failures. AV failures will cause losses to
quadruple in that category as well.
On the other hand, based on guidance from the RPV TSM, this simulation
uses a survivability value of 0.95 for a 160-minute TADAR mission compared
to 0.75 for the same time period used in previous studies. There will be
five times fewer AV kills for an equivalent time over the enemy area.
The above two effects do not cancel each other out entirely. The net
effect is that this simulation should show on the order of double the total
number of AV losses when compared to a 20-day simulation of the original
RPV concept with a survivability of 0.75.
3. Computer Outputs
The results of baseline runs 1 through 14 appear in Tables 1 and 2 and
are graphically summarized by category of effectiveness criteria in Figures
4 through 8. Table 1 presents runs made without the TADAR HS option; runs
in Table 2 include the HS. Refer to Figure 2 in Chapter II for a breakout
of mission types used in each run. Note that in moving from runs 1 and 2 to
runs 7 and 8, the RR, MTI, and 3A missions are added to the missions con-
tained in the previous run. In runs 9 and 10, however, 3B is used in place
of 3A. Runs 11 and 12 add 4A to 3B, and runs 13 and 14 replace 4A with 4B.
AV losses -are shown in the tables according to the cause of the loss,
including enemy action, equipment or procedural failures, and the AV run-
ning out of fuel. Mission coverages for each of the missions being played
are given as percentages. TADAR coverages include both relative and abso-
lute, as defined in Chapter II, Section E.1; other mission coverages are
absolute. Five of the six queueing delays are given as a -percentage fol-
lowed by a time in minutes. The percentage is the fraction of missions de-
layed for the reason indicated; the time is the average delay for those
missions that did experience a delay. The overall delay is given in minutes
42
TABLE 1. RESULTS OF BASELINE RUNS WITHOUT HS
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only, since all missions experience a delay of at least 1 minute due to the
1-minute clock increment used in the simulation. The summary figures are
discussed by topic below.
Base load quantities for runs 1 through 14 were chosen in light of the
discussion in Chapter II, section G.16. Each run includes 13 TADAR AVs plus
3 more for each additional mission payload type being played. Therefore,
runs 1 and 2 have the 13 TADAR AVs only; runs 3 and 4 have 13 TADARs plus 3
RRs; runs 5 and 6 have 13 TADARs, 3 RRs, and 3 MTIs; and so on until the
fully loaded set of runs 13 and 14, which have 13* TADARs, 3 RRs, 3 MTIs, 3
Alternate 3Bs, and 3 Alternate 4Bs for a total of 25 AVs in the base load.
Excursion runs discussed later in this chapter vary the TADAR base load
number, examining the effects of using 10 or 16 TADAR AVs as alternatives
to the 13 chosen for all baseline runs.
a. AV Losses
The total number of AV losses for all reasons is plotted in Figure 4
against the number of mission requests generated over the 20-day period of
each simulation run. The abscissa scale of "mission requests generated" is
chosen for convenience, as it is a direct output from the simulation. Plot-
ting AV losses against number of missions flown (which is proportional to
missions requested) is more meaningful than against run number, since it is
the total number' of missions that drive the mechanisms causing AVs to be
lost. Such is also the case for Figures 5 through 7.
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Figure 4 shows that total AV losses increase more or less linearly as
more missions are requested and flown. Two lines are apparent—one with and
one without the HS. Using an HS creates between 100 and 300 extra mission
requests with the only additional losses coming as a result of a few more
equipment failures, not enemy kills. Therefore, the "with HS" line reflects
approximately the same number of total losses (slightly higher on the aver-
age) as' "without HS," but further along the abscissa.
Referring back to Tables 1 and 2, although total losses increase grad-
ually as missions are added, there is no clear trend within the individual
categories of causes for AV loss. These categories are not totally free
from probabilistic effects during a 20-day run due to the long time between
events, as is evident when comparing losses from CGCS failure across the
tables. The probabilities for CGCS failure result in between one and two
instances, on the average, that a CGCS will fail when the other CGCS is
displacing or in repair itself over the course of 20 days of continuous op-
erations. In runs 3 and 7, it never occurred. In run 5, it occurred three
times with three or four AVs lost each instance. In run 13, it also oc-
curred three times, but with six or seven losses each time because more
missions are under MACS control in run 13 than in run 5. Individual loss
categories may not show consistency in a 20-day period, but probabilistic
effects roughly balance out when losses are totaled. Since losses due to
enemy action and running out of fuel do not rise significantly from the
first runs to the last, the increasing total losses can be attributed pri-
marily to increasing equipment usage and associated increases in equipment
failure.
The total loss figures also bear upon the procurement totals for RPVs
in the current budget. As of March 1982, plans [Ref. 7] called for produc-
tiori of roughly 1,000 AVs to supply 'U.S. Army needs among 16 active and 8
reserve and national guard divisions plus training and maintenance float.
If the U.S. committed 10 active and 6 reserve Army divisions to a war ef-
fort in a European scenario [Ref. 8] 16 divisions would require RPV assets.
Liberally assuming 90 percent of the total production number of AVs would
be available, committed to the war effort, and distributed equally among 16
divisions, each MACS platoon could draw from its total allocation of about
56 AVs. The lowest number of AVs lost in a 20-day MACS simulation is 64 for
the TADAR - only mission without HS.
Conclusions: AV losses increase nearly linearly with the number of
missions requested and flown, primarily due to mounting equipment failures.
There is no clear point that distinguishes acceptable from unacceptable
losses.
Assuming a 0.95 probability of survival and equipment reliabilities
stated in the ROC, 20 days of continuous operations for one MACS platoon
using only the TADAR mission will deplete that platoon's wartime allocation
of RPVs if the current production plans are maintained.
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b. Mission Coverage
TADAR relative mission coverage is plotted in Figure 5. Based on the
discussion of Section A.2 in this chapter, the coverage curve should become
asymptotic to a horizontal line at about 86 to 88 percent. The graph shows
a gradual decline in TADAR relative coverage as 'the number of mission re-
quests increase, until about 1,800 mission requests when coverage starts a
sharp decline. This is partially due to delays caused by the greater mis-
sion workload at the MACS ground facility, but as discussed later, it is
also caused by delays incurred when the MACS antenna's eight beams become
overburdened. The gradual decline from 83 to 80 percent can be justified if
benefits from the additional mission types (RR, MTI, etc.) compensate for
the reduced TADAR coverage. However, referring again to the tabulated re-
sults, the addition of the fourth alternate mission, particularly in runs
12, 13, and 14, causes a clear degradation in TADAR coverage. Coverages by
other mission types also show a sharp drop at the same point, including
those of run 11.
Differences in coverage between runs with and without the HS are dis-
cussed in Subsection d.
Conclusion; Mission coverages are relatively insensitive to an in-
creasing MACS workload until the fourth alternate mission is added, at
which point all coverages decline sharply.
c. Queueing Delays
Tables 1 and 2 show delays in six categories; Figures 6, 7, and 8 il-
lustrate four of those categories. The remaining two—RPV delays and recov-
ery net delays—do not become significant factors in the baseline runs.
They become useful when excursions are run regarding base load variations
and the addition of a third set of launch and recovery equipment.
Figures 6 and 7 plot launcher delays and overall delays, respectively,
against number of mission requests. Launcher delays are expressed as the
percentage of missions delayed at the launcher, while overall delays are
expressed in terms of the total delay time in minutes between generation of
a mission request and launch of that mission. Overall delays do not include
standard waits, such as times spent in preflight preparation and prelaunch
checkout.
Although the units on the ordinate are different for the two delays,
the graphs look quite similar, indicating that the percentage of delays in-
curred at the launcher is a factor driving the overall effectiveness of
ground system functions. Launcher delays are roughly asymptotic to the 10-
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2percent line, rising steadily until the fourth alternate is added with an
HS (see tabulated data for runs 12 and 14). The number of delays jumps over
50 percent as the system is heavily taxed. Similarly, overall delays jump
to nearly half an hour in those two runs after rising steadily from 4 or 5
minutes in the first runs. The increasing delays do not show linear behav-
ior, but are smooth until Alternate 4 is added.
Clearly, when over half the missions are waiting nearly half an hour
for a launcher, the resulting gaps in mission coverage become a significant
percentage of the potential coverage time. This is one of two main reasons
for the sharp decline in all mission coverages that was discussed in Sub-
section b.
The other reason can be inferred from the histogram of beam delays in
Figure 8. The percentage of missions delayed in receiving a launch or hand-
back beam is plotted against the number of different simultaneous missions
MACS must control and support. For example, in run 5, there are three mis-
sions to support—TADAR, RR, and MTI. In run 12, there are six—TADAR, HS,
RR, MTI, 3B, and 4A. The HS is included here as a separate mission, since
MACS must maintain an HS continuously on station and support that mission
distinctly separate from its support of the basic TADAR mission.
Runs 1 through 5 show no beam delays of either kind. When the fourth
mission is included, which is the MTI if an HS is being used (run 6) or
Alternate 3 if no HS is used (runs 7 and 9), launch beam delays occur in
about 6 percent of the missions and handback beam delays in about 3 per-
cent—both insignificant numbers. However, when the fifth mission is added
in runs 8, 10, 11, and 13, launch "beam delays jump to 24 percent and hand-
back beam delays more than double to 8 percent. Further increases to 45 and
16 percent, respectively, accompany the addition of a sixth mission in runs
12 and 14. As anticipated in the discussion of Section A.2.b of this chap-
ter, the addition of those last two missions cause substantial beam delays
because the MACS antenna can control no more than 8 AVs at a time and the
mission scenario is calling for about 10.
Conclusions: Launcher delays dominate overall CL&R system delays,'
rising steadily with the total number of missions flown and increasing
sharply when the fourth alternate mission is added.
Simultaneous control of eight RPVs is sufficient to handle the basic
TADAR mission plus three additional missions. The HS counts as one of these
missions if it is used.
This observation is not evident from the graph but from the results
of runs made by the programmers during debugging. When the system is run-
ning smoothly, about 10 percent of the missions are still delayed (though
for shorter periods) because of the mechanics of scheduling and performing
launches. See Table 3 for more evidence of this effect.
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d. Utility of the HS
When runs without an HS (Table 1 ) are compared with their sister runs
with an HS (Table 2), it is evident tha,t the HS runs show poorer coverage
performance on the average, with an HS, all mission coverages are generally
lower, ranging from 1 or 2 percent less in the TADAR coverages to as much
as 10 percent less in the alternate mission coverages (runs 11 and 12). Al-
though the differences are usually small for the first 10 runs, this result
is counterintuitive. The purpose of the HS is to increase coverage.
There are two underlying reasons for the degraded performance with an
HS. First, the additional number of missions generated by using the HS
cause more and longer delays in waiting for available launchers and beams.
This is particularly visible in the later runs when system operations are
loaded with extra missions besides the HS. Nevertheless, the percentage of
launcher delays is consistently 5 to 9 percent higher with an HS even in
the first several less burdened runs. Launch beam delay percentages are
from 12 to 18 percent higher with an HS than without when the third and
fourth alternates are played in the mission set. These figures are reason-
able, since maintaining an HS requires up to 16 extra launches per day in a
high-survivability environment, and it takes full-time control of roughly
1-1/2 MACS beams, which adversely affects all missions vying for the avail-
able eight beams.
A second significant issue in understanding the HS performance is re-
la ted to the doctrine that is assumed in this simulation for HS usage. The
discussion of Section A.2.a of this chapter pointed out that after each
displacement, an FGCS waits approximately 45 minutes for the MACS facility
to deliver its next mission AV. It was assumed that the mission commander
would desire this first mission after emplacement to be a full-term mis-
sion, that is, it would use a fresh RPV with a full fuel load. Therefore,
the mission request is processed at the MACS facility rather than provide
that FGCS with an HS that might have to return home soon after it reaches
the mssion area. In practice, the assumption used in the simulation will
probably be the rule rather than the exception, since a gap in coverage on
the order of 45 minutes every 12 hours is probably acceptable for most.
TADAR missions. With proper coordination between the newly emplaced FGCS
and the CL&R facility, that 45 minutes might be reduced significantly.
At those times when a 45-minute gap is not acceptable and in the in-
terest of providing maximum continuous coverage, an FGCS could be serviced
by the HS (if one is available at that time) and shorten its wait to
roughly 8 to 1Q minutes. Meanwhile, a new mission could also be processed
at the CL&R facility and delivered to the mission area to replace the HS if
it was nearing its time to return home when it was called. This procedure
-i
when AVs are seldom killed by the enemy, the HS mission has less in-
fluence on overall system effectiveness because HSs are launched and re-
turned to base more often than they are used for their designated purpose.
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should increase TADAR mission coverage, but would not alleviate any exist-
ing delays at the CL&R facility.
Conclusion: The additional number of missions generated by the use of
an HS strains system operations such that all mission coverages are re-
duced. A revised HS concept could increase coverages by as much as 5 per-
cent but would not alleviate existing ground system delays.
B. EXCURSIONS
This section presents the results of excursion runs that examine the
effects of changing selected input parameters on the operational effective-
ness of a MACS, with the exception of the set of base load runs, which were
performed before the baseline runs, excursions were chosen after analyzing
results from the baseline runs, giving consideration to topics currently
receiving attention within the RPV community.
1. Base Load Variations
The quantity of TADAR AVs in the base load for runs 1 through 14 was
established at 13 according to rationale discussed in Chapter II, Sections
F.8 and G.16. To test the adequacy of that quantity, excursions with 10.and
16 TADAR AVs were run for the basic TADAR mission, both with and without
the HS option. The results of these four runs are given in Table 3, along
with the previously tabulated results of runs with 13 AVs for comparison.
There are no clear conclusions to be drawn from the AV losses. One
might observe that losses when using the HS are generally higher, but there
are not enough data to be confident that the abnormally high losses in one
run are not due to random effects.
TADAR coverages do show a trend. There is no significant difference
between coverage achieved with base loads of 13 or 16 AVs. When only 10 AVs
are used, however, coverage decreases by about 3 or 4 percent. The reason
can be seen in the RPV delays. In three of four runs with 13 or 16 base
load, only 1 percent of the mission requests were delayed in being assigned
an AV; the fourth run shows only 5 percent delayed. With 10 AVs in the base
load, RPV delay fractions increase to 14 percent for the non-HS run and 32
percent for the HS run.
Runs using a base load of 7 TADAR AVs were not performed, in view of
the degradation already apparent with 10. Base loads not conforming to the
4 + 3C equation (see Chapter II, Section F.8) are also not considered. The
base load of three AVs for each additional pay load beyond the basic TADAR
mission is deemed necessary and sufficient to sustain normal operations;
therefore, no variations on that quantity were exercised.
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TABLE 3. TADAR BASE LOAD VARIATIONS
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10 13 " 16
25 26 26
11 12 10
7 3 3
12 8 10
11 15 12
0 0 7
72 64 68
80 84 83
69 71 71
11/25 1/11 1/36
12/17 10/16 9/11
0/0 0/0 0/0
0/0 0/0 0/0
2/5 2/5 2/6
7 1 3
WITH HS
10 13 16
33 28 38
.6 16 19
1 2 ' 5
2 7 11
27 18 17
2 0 3
71 . 71 96
80 83 83
69 72 71
32/28 5/29 1/30
11/15 17/12 16/15
0/0 0/0 0/0
0/0 0/0 0/0
3/1 5/1 5/6
12 5 5
Conclusions: A base load of 13 TADAR AVs and 3 each of other payload
types is sufficient to sustain continuous FGCS operations at a high level
of effectiveness.
A base load of 10 TADAR AVs provides comparable mission coverage and
may be adequate if delays are acceptable.
2. Three L&Rs and CGCSs
Since the primary delays in the baseline runs were in being assigned a
launcher and a beam, the next set of excursions adds first a third L&R set,
then a third CGCS to the baseline runs with three and four alternates and
an HS, namely runs 8, 10, 12, and 14. The primary purpose of a third L&R
set is to investigate whether substantial launcher delays encountered in
these runs can be alleviated. The third CGCS is for examining whether per-
turbations caused when a CGCS fails while the other is unavailable for duty
are significant, and if so, whether they can be eliminated. Note that the
3-CGCS runs include the third L&R set. Also, in order to fit the equation 6
+ 3C, the TADAR base load in these runs is reduced to 12, while other mis-
sions still have 3 AVs each. The results of these eight runs are presented
in Table 4 and should be compared to the corresponding runs in Table 2.
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0 0 0 0
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70 70 72 67
93 92 91 87
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14/15 17/14 34/23 42/22
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There is no clear trend in AV losses with the addition of a third L&R
set. One would expect that AV losses are not directly affected by launch
and recovery equipment, but more so by total operational hours of flight-
critical items, such as the GCSs (including GDTs) and the AV itself. The
third recovery net does not appear to eliminate AVs running out of fuel,
indicating that the reason they run out of fuel has more to do with hand-
back beam delays that overrun the 15-minute fuel reserve. Also, the third
net displaces with one or the o'ther CGCS, meaning two nets are on the move,
while one operates. Recovery queues naturally still develop during this
time.
The only significant change in AV losses when the third CGCS is added
is that AVs are no longer lost due to CGCS failure, while this may save up
to 19 AVs in some runs (see run 13 in Table 1), the overall losses are not
consistently decreased.
Mission coverages of all types are generally enhanced by the addition
of the third L&R set, but not significantly increased when the third CGCS
is in turn added. The former is due to the diminished delays with the extra
launch equipment, but again there is no indication that three CGCSs benefit
the overall results. The largest increases in coverage are for the non-
TADAR missions when compared with runs 8, 10, 12, and 14. With the third
*t~>-;*
i-.vV^
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LSR present, mission coverages for all missions are comparable to those in
runs having one fewer alternate mission and only two L&R sets . In other
words, the third L&R allows one more alternate mission to be added to the
MACS fleet. The fully loaded scenario, however, still suffers a sharp drop
in mission coverage (see coverages of alternates in runs 17, 18, 21, and 22
and TADAR coverages in runs 18 and 22). . •
Queueing delays are clearly influenced in these excursions. RPV delays
drop to 1 percent or less when the third CGCS is present. While one CGCS is
displacing, two are operating, resulting in two- thirds of the base load
being available instead of only half when two CGCSs are used.
The fraction of launcher delays is cut from over 30 percent in runs 8
and 10 to 15 percent or less when the third LSR is added. That is less than
in run 2, which had only the basic TADAR mission plus HS. Higher mission
coverages reflect the return to "normal" launch operations. Launch delays
are also decreased from about 55 percent in runs 12 and 14 to an average of
37 percent in runs 17, 18, 21, and 22. However, that figure is still high
enough to cause large overall delays and degraded mission coverages.
Decreased launch delays with the same number of mission requests re-
sult in more missions on a launcher asking for a beam. Therefore, the num-
ber of launch beam delays increases. The larger number of beam delays is
not enough to counterbalance the diminished launch delays in runs 15, 16,
19, and 20, but does so in the runs with four alternates.
An important note here is that it was assumed the third CGCS does not
increase the total number of beams that are available to the MACS section,
as explained in Chapter II, Section F.3. If this were feasible, the third
CGCS could be a great asset to MACS operations. As it is, the third CGCS
merely serves as a backup on the infrequent occasions when both of the
other CGCSs are unavailable. .
Conclusions: The addition of a third launcher would decrease launcher
delays enough to allow another alternate mssion to be flown by MACS.
The third recovery system and CGCS do not significantly benefit system
ope ra t io ns .
3 . Reduced Probability of Survival
The enemy's perception of the value of an RPV to U.S. forces has a
large influence on his decision to allocate limited assets to pursue and
kill the RPV if detected. The 0.95 probability of survival used in the
baseline runs for a TADAR mission can be viewed either as an upper bound on
the effectiveness of the RPV's survivability design or the result of condi-
tions where the enemy perceives the RPV as of little value to friendly
forces, or both. Six excursions were performed postulating that conditions
might exist where the RPV's survivability drops to 0.75. This number has
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been used in earlier program documentation studies already referenced in
this report and might be considered a lower bounding case for this study.
All penetrating missions are subject to the increased kill rate.
Of the six runs, numbers 23 and 24 are identical to baseline runs 9
and 10, and excursions 25 and 26 are identical to baseline runs 1 and 2 in
all respects except for the survivability factor. The othe'r two runs — 27
and 28—are identical to 24 except for the resupply times. Table 5 displays
the results for all six excursions.
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23 25
191 154
13 11
4 2
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1 0
248 192
77 79
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2/9 0/0
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24 26
184 156
8 15
8 6
10 8
23 14
3 3
236 202
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35/18 12/8
13/13 0/0
7/7 0/0
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WITH HS
27 28
160 168
13 9
9 5
10 9
30 21
4 5
226 217
79 70
69 60
91 81
86 71
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._
2/20 13/31
34/17 27/27
15/13 10/13
6/9 4/8
7/4 6/5
13 24
As expected, AV kills increase by a factor of four to six when compar-
ing excursion and baseline runs. No other AV loss category shows a substan-
tive change. The AV kills cause lower coverages for all missions—a 3- to
5-percent drop in TADARs and nonpenetrating alternates (RR and Alternate 3)
and about a 10-percent drop in the penetrating alternate mission (MTI). The
only significant changes in delay percentages are that RPV delay fractions
increase, expecially in the HS case, and handback beams are more available.
The former point reflects an increased strain on the base load because AVs
are being lost more frequently while resupply remains constant in runs 23
through 26. Handback beams are not in as much demand because the more RPVs
that are killed on mission, the fewer that require a beam to come home.
55
The significant result from runs 23 and 24 is that the HS still pro-
vides less coverage when it is used than when it is not. The reasons for
this are subtle and only partly evident from the computer outputs. First,
although the HS is being used more often for its designated purpose when
the kill rate is high, there are still about 10 percent more TADAR-payload
missions generated (and subsequent launches performed) when the HS is used.
With MACS operations already under a high workload (as was seen in runs 9
and 10), this 10 percent adds to an already strained system.
Second, AVs are being lost frequently and resupply takes 6 hours once
initiated, resulting in a strained base load where an AV is unavailable a
higher percentage of the time. This is true with or without the HS, but is
more severe when the HS mission contends for the available base load. When
no TADAR AVs are available, the simulation attempts to fulfill requests for
TADAR AVs by interchanging a spare TADAR payload with an unwanted payload
installed in an available RPV. The interchange takes an hour and is per-
formed 41 more times in run 24 (with HS) than in run 23 (without). Coverage
gaps accrue.
Third, only about half of the AV kills are replaced by an HS. In the
other half, the standard mechanism that generates a follow-on TADAR mission
has already been activated before the current mission AV is killed. An HS
is not sent when a replacement is already on the way.
For these reasons, the benefits of faster replacement times provided
by the HS for killed AVs in the relatively few cases per day in each FGCS
mission area are outweighed by delays caused as the HS adds extra missions
to an already strained system.
The first evidence that an HS can be- beneficial overall is seen in
runs 25 and 26. These use only the basic TADAR mission with and without the ||S
HS and therefore represent the system with no real strain on it. Coverages fet%
are still lower -than in runs 1 and 2 because of the lower AV survivability. £&
However, the HS run produces higher coverage than the run without the HS. A -g|!
1-percent difference is not enough by itself to draw valid conclusions in fF|s
this simulation, but the 5-percent decrease from run 1 to 25 compared to j$g
only a 3-percent decrease from run 2 to 26 is a bit more material. Even f|^
with RPV delays over 10 percent in run 26, coverage is maintained at a high ?|§K
level. ' • lp!
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Run 27 is identical•to run 24, but the resupply time has been short- !=£•
ened to 3 hours. RPV delays are reduced significantly; therefore, payload fi|£
interchanges are required less frequently (50 fewer, not shown). Although |j^
launch and beam delays do not change, coverages increase by about 5 percent iff
for all missions when compared to run 24. In fact, the combination of an HS , £C
with short resupply times produces generally better coverages than without "g&
the HS (run 23), where resupply times are not critical, even in a heavily |v£
loaded scenario.
 f gtf
On the other hand, if the resupply mechanism is such that times on the pgi
order of 12 hours are more valid, run 28 shows coverages will suffer dra- p|>
matically as RPV delays and payload interchanges increase. §s-
V.~: > '
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Conclusions: With an RPV survivability of 0.75, AV losses multiply
fivefold and all mission coverages decrease 4 to 6 percent.
Even with the higher kill rate, the benefits of the HS are outweighed
in a heavily loaded scenario by delays caused because of the number of ex-
tra missions the HS generates. However, when system operations are not
otherwise tasked by additional RPV mission'types, the HS provides equal or
better coverage than in runs where it is not used.
A fast resupply time in combination with the HS also alleviates most
of the HS-related burdens in a low-survivability continuous coverage envi-
ronment .
Payload interchange times cause delays that appear unacceptable for
that operation to be standard procedure in launch preparations for
continuous-coverage missions.
4. Less Frequent CGCS Displacement
Forward ground stations will probably not displace more than twice
every day but could be forced by combat conditions to move only once each
day. This, however, is not operationally desired, so no excursions are per-
formed that vary FGCS displacement parameters.
On the other hand, two moves per day for the CL&R facility may be ex-
cessive, considering its distance from the PLOT and that current RPV sec-
tions are experiencing difficulty during tests meeting displacement time-
lines spelled out in the O&O concept. Run 29 examines effects of the CGCSs
and associated equipment displacing once every second day, with a timeline
of 4 hours for each full CL&R set to displace, move, and emplace. The op-
tion of once every other day was chosen instead of once per day in order to
emphasize any effects resulting from the less frequent displacements. Once
per day with a 4-hour timeline is probably not much different from twice
per day with a 2-hour timeline. Results of run 29 are included in Table 6
and should be compared to baseline run 10.
Less frequent CGCS displacements have a significant effect on all mis-
sion coverages, increasing TADAR coverage by 4 percent and alternates cov-
erages by 8 percent. Since CGCSs and launchers spend half as much total
time moving, there are two of each of these pieces of equipment available
more often. Catastrophic CGCS failures are reduced (there are none in run
29) and launcher delays decrease. Launch beam delay fractions increase be-
cause more AVs are on launchers ready to fly, asking for a beam.
Conclusion: Halving the total time' the CL&R facility spends in dis-
placement increases mission coverages significantly—about 4 percent for
TADAR and 8 percent for alternate missions.
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TABLE 6. CGCS DISPLACEMENT AND EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY EXCURSIONS
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HANDOVER FAIL
AV FAIL
FUEL GONE
TOTAL
TADAR: REL
: ABS
RR
NT I
ALT 3
ALT 1
RPV
LAUNCHER
LAUNCH BEAM
HANDBACK BEAM
RECOVERY
OVERALL (MIN)
SIMILAR TO BASELINE RUNS:
10 ? 10
. FEWER DISPLACEMENTS
29
32
11
0
7
38
5
96
83
73
97
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—1/28
21/11
30/15
9/9
1/5
11
HIGHER RELIABILITIES
30 • '31
38 38
10 11
6 21
10 8
11 13
0 5
75 99
86 83
76 72
98 91
99 93
99 91
__
1/10 2/11
18/9 28/13
7/12 27/11
3/7 10/9
6/1 7/1
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S. Increased Equipment Reliability
In Sections G.1 and G.2 of Chapter II, assumed reliability and main-
tenance figures for the RPV equipment were taken directly from the ROC. As
the RPV program has matured and performed limited testing, reliability num-
bers representing expected equipment performance have become available from
the contractor. Excursion runs 30 and 31 are identical to baseline runs 9
and 10—having the TADAR, RR, MTI, and 3B missions, with and ' without the
HS—except for the following changes [Ref. 9]:
• Launcher and recovery subsystems are not allowed to fail. The re-
vised reliabilities are high enough that only one or two failures
would result in 20 days of continuous operations, introducing
' probabilistic effects. To avoid that, the ideal case of no fail-
ures is assumed.
• All mission payloads are assumed to have an MTBF of 443.4 hours,
the currently estimated figure for the TV payload.
• The AV has a reliability of 0.9905 for completing 3^ hours of con-
tinual operation.
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• Forward and central ground station reliabilities do not change.
The revised figures are close enough to the ROC values that no
impact on system operations would be visible from the simulation.
• Equipment repair times and distributions are as follows (in min-
utes) :
90% 10%
GCSs 16 121
Launcher 23 118.
Recovery Net 17 116
The longer repair times include 1 hour travel time for general
support maintenance teams. Repairs for AVs and payloads are not
played in the simulation since AVs are assumed to fail only in
flight (and are lost), and failed payloads are assumed to be in-
terchanged with a good payload concurrently with other ground op-
erations.
Results for runs 30 and 31 also appear in Table 6 and are to be compared
with baseline runs 9 and 10.
The only meaningful change in the number of AVs lost is in AV fail-
ures. The higher AV flight reliability reduces losses by over 50 percent in
that category. Other loss categories are unaffected by the enhanced relia-
bility figures used in these runs, particularly since FGCS and CGCS failure
rates were not changed. Overall losses should drop by an amount equal to
the decrease in AV-failure losses, but the variation in overall losses from
run to run is still too high to clearly see that effect. For example, even
with the same CGCS reliability numbers, comparable .runs 10 and 31 had
losses due to CGCS failure of 0 and 24 AVs, respectively. In the latter
case, there were four failures of the only available CGCS at those times,
with a loss of 5 to 8 AVs each instance. Such an event did not occur (by
chance) in run 10.
All mission coverages increase 3 to 5 percent with the enhanced relia-
bilities and reduced maintenance times. This can primarily be attributed to
the absence of launcher failures, which results in a lower percentage of
launcher delays with reduced average wait times. Also, the fewer number of
AV and payload failures are responsible for reducing the number of unex-
pected replacements required and the accompanying coverage gaps. Perform-
ance with the HS still lags behind that when it is not used.
Conclusion: Enhanced mission performance achieved with the introduc-
tion of improved reliability and maintenance figures indicates that trade-
offs should be investigated vis-a-vis continued efforts to increase equip-
ment reliability as an alternative to pursuing other system enhancements
postulated in this study.
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6. MACS-to-FLOT Range
' Baseline runs have the MACS complex located 35 kilometers from the
PLOT. Excursion runs 32 and 33 examine the effects of using a MACS-to-FLOT
distance of 25 and 50 kilometers, respectively.
The principal effects of this range on the simulation are reflected in
the time for resupply to be accomplished, the time for general support
maintenance teams to travel to the CL&R section, the frequency with which
the central facility must displace to confuse enemy location techniques,
and the time AVs spend in transit back from the mission area. The latter
parameter increases by 11.5 minutes when the AV must fly an additional 25
kilometers to the recovery net.
The time spent in transit out to the mission area is not similarly
affected by distance from the PLOT. Since RPVs can climb at the same rate
during climbout and transit out to the mission area, the time from launch
to arrival on station is determined by the altitude at which the AV must
cross the PLOT, not the range to the PLOT. For a traverse-FLOT altitude of
2,000 meters, the foregoing is true out to about 66 kilometers, at which
point the AV spends no time in strictly vertical climbout.
The inputs used for the parameters mentioned are as follows:
MACS-FLOT range (km) 25 35 50
Resupply (hr) 8 6 4
GS maintenance MTTR (min) 210 180 150
CL&R displacements/day 2 2 1
Resupply variances result from the time required to drive different
distances. Similarly, general support teams are assumed to travel another
half-hour longer or shorter from the times used in baseline runs; times
shown are total MTTR including travel. From a baseline of two moves per
day, sections 25 kilometers from the FLOT are assumed to move as often, but
only half as often when at 50 kilometers.
Runs 32 and 33 include the same missions used in baseline run 12. Re-
sults of the excursions are given in Table 7, with the 35-kilometer data
from run 12 included for comparison.
In moving from the 25-kilometer to 50-kilometer run, total AV losses
rise. Upon closer examination, this rise appears to be due to random ef-
fects and is not a true trend. For example, enemy kills increase over 60
percent from run 32 to run 33, but RPVs spend the same amount of time over
enemy territory in all three runs. Also, AV failures increase by a third
moving left to right across the table. This could be justified in part be-
cause at. the greater range, AVs spend more time in transit and less time on
station. Therefore, they must be replaced more frequently, meaning more
total AVs are in the air on the average at any instant. This increases
total flight -hours and thereby chances for failure. But the effect should
be smaller than results indicate.
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TABLE 7. MACS-TO-FLOT RANGE VARIATIONS
ENEMY KILL
M FGCS FAIL
£ CGCS FAIL
_§ HANDOVER FAIL
g AV FAIL
^ FUEL GONE
TOTAL
£ TADAR: REL
z """ : ABS
« < KK
2 jg MTI
3 ALT 3
ALT 4
* RPV
o -^ LAUNCHER
2 "•' LAUNCH BEAM
3 £ HANDBACK BEAM
« 3 RECOVERY
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 OVERALL (MIN)
•
25- KM
32
24
12
7
10
28
10 .
91
74
64
86
79
80
81
2/39
55/32
32/17
15/9
10/5
28
MACS-TO-FLOT
35 KM
12 . •
32
21
8
10
30
8
109
76
66
83
31
80
81
2/18
54/25
43/18
14/10
7/5
97
50 KM
33
39
10
8
12
37
17
123
75
65
87
86
85
83
1/18'
50/22
57/21
16/11
6/5
26
Of the remaining results, the notable differences between runs are in
alternate mission coverages for run 33 and launch beam delays across the
board. Alternates' coverages are higher for the 50-kilometer case because
CLSRs displace half as frequently. Launch beam delay fractions nearly
double from left to right but are compensated by decreased launcher delay
times, resulting in comparable overall delays among the three runs.
TADAR coverages are likewise not significantly different for the three
cases. From previous discussions, the performances appear to be influenced
more by mission workloads, which are approximately equal here.
Conclusion: Mission performance under the assumptions specified in
this simulation is relatively insensitive to variations in range from the
CL&R to the PLOT.
Other factors not modeled in the simulation will likely determine the
best location for the MACS central facility. Such factors could include:
• The command and control structure for the proposed MACS platoon,
whose mission responsibilities might extend across several Army
disciplines
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• Technical characteristics of communications devices to be used
between MACS units, especially FGCSs and CGCSs
• Range of the MICNS data link, and the mission profiles of pene-
trating RPVs it must control
• Vulnerability of the CL&R complex to enemy weapons.
The first three factors are subjects of continuing studies within the
RPV community. Ground system vulnerability is a mature area of analysis
within the RPV program, with ballistic hardening criteria already estab-
lished and incorporated into existing hardware.
The effect of MACS-to-FLOT range on ground system vulnerability is re-
lated to the capabilities of the enemy's weapons and his willingness to
pursue efforts to render the MACS facility inoperable. With respect to the
capabilities of enemy ground fire, if the CL&R complex were 25 kilometers
from the PLOT, it would be at the edge of the engagement range of known
enemy proliferation artillery weapons deployed in the forward area [Ref.
10]. Moving back to 35 kilometers would place MACS beyond the .range of
those weapons and into a category where if the enemy is determined to de-
stroy the ground systems, there is little difference between 35 and 50 ki-
lometers from the PLOT.
Ranges beyond 35 kilometers appear to provide no substantial benefits,
while remaining as close as possible to forward units and RPV target areas
would lessen the technical challenges mentioned in the earlier bullets.
7. Increased TADAR Fuel Load
Presently, the RPV is programmed for a 180-minute flight plus 15 min-
utes of reserve fuel using either the FLIR or TV TADAR payload. Analyses
have shown [Ref. 11] that it might be possible to achieve a 5-hour flight
endurance if modifications are made to the AV. Although it has not been
proven if the 5-hour endurance were possible, excursions 32 and 33 examine
the potential effects of such an endurance for TADAR missions. Results
appear in Table 8 and can be compared with runs 9 and 10, identical except
for the fuel load.
Coverages are among the highest achieved in any run performed under
the current study, with 5 to 7 percent better TADAR coverage and up to 8
percent better alternate coverages than in runs 9 and 10. RPV delays are
negligible, while launcher and launch beam delays are cut nearly in half.
The 5-hour endurance allows TADAR AVs to be over the mission area
twice as long as with a 3-hour endurance. Since TADAR missions are the
majority of all missions launched by the CLSR and they are reduced to half
the previous number, all delays are minimized. Also, the HS now stays on
station 2 hours longer than before, reducing its load on MACS operations to
about seven missions per day—not the strain it was before. Therefore, cov-
erage with the HS is equivalent to that without it, even though delays are
still higher.
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TABLE 8. 5-HOUR FUEL LOAD FOR TADAR RPVs
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> AV FAIL
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5
2
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0
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—0/0
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6/4
• 5
HS
35
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11
5
3
38
3
qi
86
73
97
98
98
—1/18
20/14
12/16
6/11
6/6
q
'Conclusion: A postulated 5-hour' planned endurance for TADAR-eguipped
RPVs (including the HS) would *produce 5 to 8 percent higher coverages than
identical runs with a 3-hour TADAR endurance.
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IV. SUPPORTING OSO ANALYSES
This chapter presents the analyses of personnel and equipment require-
ments for the MACS and C data rates for ground coordination among MACS
units.
A. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS g§
?p?NX
This analysis is based on the requirements of the current RPV CL&R gsg
concept [Ref. 12], which is designed for 24-hour-a-day operations. From j^ff.
that basis, manpower and items of equipment are postulated that might be §?;
necessary to support MACS operations as different RPV missions are added. ivg
No evaluation is made in this study as to the adequacy of the proposed O&O ^
concept for those current CL&R operations that would also become standard $£%
for MACS, considering the similarities between the two systems. Also, the j|f
personnel and equipment estimates here are assumed unconstrained by Army- £§?•
wide manpower and cost considerations. There are several other important |p
assumptions concerning MACS operations that are pertinent to this portion p|
of the study. Ill
B
First, forward ground stations are assumed to be exactly the same for |§
MACS as in the current CL&R complex. Personnel and equipment, therefore, do Sjj
not change and are not further considered. • • £%
-^^.i'vB=S
Second, the MACS CGCS is assumed to perform primarily an air traffic S£
control function for multiple airborne RPVs, coordinating launches, recov- |a
eries, prelaunch activities, transits, and handovers while also monitoring teg
the status of certain alternate missions while they are on station. It is ,||
therefore presumed that interpretation and subsequent dissemination of any ' *Sfi
video data received through the MICNS downlink (e.g., from MTI RPVs) is not ?p}
the responsibility of personnel in the CGCS. That duty is assumed delegated te
to operators in a separate facility, whose relationship to the CGCS will be ?£•;
functionally similar to the relationship between CGCS and TADAR FGCS. The ujjy
MACS-peculiar ground station, however, need not be geographically separated ';?:,
from the MACS central facility. £r;
Finally, in view of the above, detailed mission planning is assumed to 'S':;
take place at the responsible mission ground control s.tation, not the CGCS. f^J
Therefore, TADAR mission profiles are planned at the FGCS once direction is !:x{:i
received from the commander of the supported unit, who determines desired &A
areas of TADAR coverage for that mission. ^
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Table 9 presents the estimated personnel and equipment requirements
for several key MACS mission configurations along with those of the current
RPV CL&R concept. The tabulated data for MACS reflect mission configura-
tions used in computer runs 1, 5, 13, 17} and 21, as discussed in the pre-
vious chapters. Run 1 included only the basic TADAR mission; run 5 also in-
eluded the RR and MTI; run 13 added alternates 3 and 4 to t-hat. Those three
mission sets used two LSR systems and two CGCSs at the central facility.
Runs 17 and 21 both had three L&Rs, but included two and three CGCSs, re-
spectively. They also had all four alternates, as in run 13. The figures in
Table 9 are independent of whether or not the HS is used.
The only personnel changes from the current CL&R concept to the MACS
with two L&Rs are in operator/mechanics, AV and mission payload (MP) opera-
tors, and operators in separate ground stations peculiar to MACS. An in-
crease in operator/mechanics to eight in the fully loaded scenario (run 13)
is projected due to the corresponding increase in the number of MACS-
peculiar vans (discussed later) and the complexity of four alternate pay-
loads requiring periodic maintenance.
MP operators, though desired in the current CL&R concept for possible
control of a TADAR mission from the CGCS, are not included as part of the
MACS requirements, since only air traffic control functions are allowed, as
discussed previously. AV operators increase with the number of alternate
missions. In the TADAR-only scenario, one operator on duty in each CGCS
(and one backup each for the next shift) should be able to handle servicing
functions for the four forward ground stations. Each AV operator is assumed
to be capable of monitoring the activities of two AVs (i.e., two beams) at
a time on the average. There are times he will be fully occupied with one
AV in prelaunch and other times he will have only to keep track of two or
three AVs on a preprogrammed transit route. In the fully loaded scenario,
all eight MACS beams will be used quite often, requiring four AV operators
on each shift for a total of eight. If "park and fly" procedures are imple-
mented for missions requiring only infrequent control and status updates/
three AV operators per shift would probably be sufficient under noncontin-
uous operating conditions and in many situations where continuous opera-
tions are required for short periods.
Additional personnel are required when missions passing video data are
flown. The configuration of run 5 was chosen for inclusion in the table be-
cause it uses the MTI RPV. For reasons discussed earlier, this requires a
separate facility to conduct such a mission. The details of what that fa-
cility will encompass are beyond the scope of this study, but an MTI GCS
van (similar to -a TADAR FGCS) is assumed colocated with each CGCS for a
total of two vans to support continuous MTI operations during CL&R dis-
placement. MTI operators in the van include an AV operator, MP operator,
and a mission commander, for a total of six additional personnel in config-
uration 5. Similarly, run 13 adds two more vans and six more people to sup-
port continuous operations of Alternate 4, a penetrating RPV-whose mission
data must be interpreted and distributed to appropriate users.
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TABLE 9. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AT CL&R COMPLEX
Comparable Run No.
No. of Alternates
Personnel
RPV technician
Section chief
Team leader
LSR team chief
Operator/mech .
AV operator
MP operator
Crewmen
Generator mech.
MACS-peculiar
Total
Equipment
CGCS - 5T
Launcher - 5T
Recovery - 5T
AV handler - 5T
Maint. van - 5T
AV cargo - 5T
Other cargo - 5T
MACS-peculiar - 5T
Total 5T
CGDT
Cargo - 5/4 T
30-kW gen.
AV base load
Current
CLSR
Concept
_
-
2
2
4
2
6
4
4
12
2
_ _
38
2
2
2
2
2
4
2
_^ ^
16
2
4
4
16
MACS Concept
2 L&Rs +
2 CGCSs
1 5 1 3
0 2 4
2 2 2
2 2 . 2
4 4 4
2 2 2
6 6 8
4 6' 8
0 0 0
12 12 12
2 2 2
0 6 1 2
34 42 52
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
3 5 7
2 - 2 2
0 2 4
15 19 23
2 2 2
4 4 4
4 6 8
13 19 25
3 L&Rs +
2 CGCSs 3 CGCSs-
17 21
.4 4
2 3
2 3
6 6
3 3
9 9
8 9
0 0
18 18
2 3
12 18
62 72
2 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
3 3
6 6
2 3
4 6
26 30
2 3
5 6
8 12
24 24
The configuration of run 17, with three L&Rs, adds a third set of per-
sonnel and equipment associated with L&R operations to the basic TADAR con-
figuration. The exception is AV operators, which remain' at eight, since
that is the maximum number required to monitor eight MACS beams. The con-
figuration of run 21 adds to the above a third set of personnel and equip-
ment associated with mission control. AV operators are increased to nine so
that each CGCS has an equal number. The personnel and equipment added due
to the MTI and Alternate 4 missions now include three pairs of mission-
peculiar GCSs, each van containing three operators.
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As the AV base load increases to accommodate more types of RPV mis-
sions, the number of AV cargo trucks also increases. Each cargo truck car-
ries three AVs and each AV handler carries two. Generators also increase as
additional GCSs are added to the complex. Currently, equipment and air con-
ditioning power requirements draw about 24 kilowatts from the 30 produced
by one operating generator. The second generator per GCS is for backup.'
When two MTI vans are added in configuration 5, only two generators (in-
stead of two per van) are added to the total for the CL&R facility. For
each CGCS/MTI van pair, two generators could be operating at. a time with
the third as backup. In configuration 13, there are a total of eight gener-
ators in the CL&R complex to provide power for four MACS-peculiar GCSs, two
CGCSs, plus maintenance shelters.
B. C3 DATA RATES FOR GROUND COORDINATION
Data rates are estimated for message traffic between MACS units, i.e.,
between CGCSs and FGCSs, that are geographically separated and must use
radio or data link communications to pass information. Message traffic be-
tween elements of colocated units and either into or out of the MACS pla-
toon is not included in this analysis. Colocated units are assumed to be
linked by hardwire or using internal radio nets. Communications with out-
side units (such as on FGCS receiving mission orders from its supported
artillery battalion) are considered independent of MACS operations and are
not peculiar to this study.
The assumptions stated at the beginning of section A above, especially
concerning the air traffic control function of the CGCS and* mission plan-
ning responsibility of the FGCS, are pertinent to this analysis as well.
The approach is to - first determine the types of messages that would pass
between MACS units to coordinate activities; next, estimate the frequency
of those messages under standard continuous operations; and finally, esti-
mate the amount of information required in each message.
There are basically five types of messages to be passed:
• Mission requests from the FGCSs to the CGCSs
• Notifications from the FGCSs of intended displacement
• Acknowledgements by either party of messages received
• Notification from the CGCS of late arrival of replacement AV due
to delays
• Coordination messages during handover procedures.
There are also routine and emergency messages that will occur as a result
of operations, but these are not considered in the analysis due to their
variability in frequency and content.
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Table 10 shows the expected frequency of messages by type between sep-
arated elements of the MACS platoon. Mission requests generated by the FGCS
are enumerated in five categories. The normal replacement of an ongoing
TADAR mission will likely be requested by the FGCS in control of the mis-
sion, rather than by some automatic procedure at the CGCS as used'for con-
venience in the computer simulation. Each of•the four FGCSs operates ap-
proximately 21 hours per day (3 hours for two displacements) with TADAR
missions lasting about 2 hours each for a total of 42 nominal replacement
requests per day. Not all of these will actually be generated, due to AV
kills, etc., while on mission. The figure represents an expected maximum.
TABLE 10. TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF MESSAGES WITHIN MACS PLATOON
Messages per day
(average)
FGCS to CGCS
Mission requests
Normal replacement
AV killed or lost
MPS failed
FGCS emplaced
FGCS repaired
Notifications
FGCS displacing
FGCS failed
Acknowledgments
CGCS to FGCS
42
2
1
8
1
8
1
variable
Acknowledgments
Change orders
Handovers
CGCS/FGCS
Two-way (x5)
One-way forward (x4)
One-way back ( x3)
CGCS/CGCS (x6)
Total
55
variable
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The remaining numbers of mission requests are based on inputs for
equipment reliability and FGCS displacements, as discussed in Chapter II.
Notification must also be sent to the CGCS when the FGCS must displace
during an ongoing TADAR mission. This message therefore generates a request
for handback and return of the AV to the CL&R. FGCS failures are only crit-
ical to the CGCS if a replacement AV is outbound, in which case the AV'is
either rerouted, placed in a waitng orbit, or returned.'
The primary reason messages would be sent from the CGCS to the FGCS is
in acknowledgment of messages received. The quantity of 55 comes from 54
mission requests plus 1 FGCS failure notification. The eight notifications
of FGCS displacement are followed up with handback procedures rather than
simply an acknowledgment. The frequency of change orders from the CGCS no-
tifying forward elements of delays in RPV deliveries on station will vary
according to the workload, but is not expected to be high in any event
since FGCS operators will start sending in requests earlier if delays at
the CGCS persist over extended periods of the day.
There are four types of handovers. Those between FGCSs and CGCSs can
be two-way (for normal replacements and exchange for AVs with a failed
MPS), one-way forward (for other mission requests listed), or one-way back
(when the FGCS must hand back a mission AV due to impending displacement).
RPVs must also be handed from a CGCS getting ready to displace to its as so-
ciated CGCS that has just completed emplacement at a new location. These
are all one-way handovers.
Two-way FGCS and CGCS handovers are assumed to require a sequence of
five messages to accomplish the procedure:
Sender Message
CGCS Ready to commence handover
FGCS Acknowledge '
FGCS Old AV placed in dead-recon orbit
FGCS Control of replacement AV established
CGCS Acknowledge
t
*
The CGCS must still acquire the dead-reckoning AV but need not send a mes-
sage confirming it since the FGCS could not help if acquisition were unsuc-
cessful. Eighty percent of the mission requests requiring two-way handover
are assumed to eventually result in handover (others are aborted or made
one-way because of AV kill, etc. ) for a total of 34 events with five mes-
sages each.
One-way forward handovers need only four messages—the third in the
sequence above is eliminated. One-way back handovers also eliminate the
second message in the sequence, since it is the FGCS that generates the "I
am displacing" message and waits for the CGCS to acknowledge with "ready to
commence handback. "
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CGCS-to-CGCS handovers require a ready-to-commence message/ acknowl-
edgment, followed by pairs of "transferring AV" and "AV acquired" messages
for each AV under MACS control at the time. For an average of two airborne
TADAR KPVs under MACS control at all times to service only the basic TADAR
FGCS missions, that is six messages for the handover sequence. (If eight
AVs are under MACS control, as in the fully loaded scenarios described in
Chapter II, there could be a string of 18 messages in the -sequence.) Two
CGCS displacements per day are assumed for the total of 12 messages per day
in Table 10.
The total of all messages generated during an average day of standard
MACS operations comes to less than 400. Peak hourly loads could double the
average rate, but still should not burden data communications expected to
be in place by the time MACS is fielded.
The information contained in each message will vary with the message
type, but the following list should include all the information necessary
to communicate the proposed messages:
Message ID
Time of message
-* •
f. _Sender
Location of sender
Destination address
Purpose of message
Status
Type of handover
Time of handover
Coordinates of AV being relinquished
RPV code/ frequency, and synchronization
Comments
»
The purpose could be "requesting replacement RPV," "acknowledging message
received," "abort previous message," "control of AV established," etc. Sta-
tus would then refer to a reason for the message, if applicable. Examples
are "AV killed," "MPS failed," "standard replacement," etc. Type of hand-
over is two-way or one-way forward or back. The comments are for any addi-
tional information not covered by the standard format. There are approxi-
mately .10 items of information that would be passed in the maximum-length
message under this format, not including alphanumeric comments.
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ACRONYMS
AV
C3
CACDA
CGCS
CGDT
CL&R
CSTAL
DS
FGCS
PLOT
GCS
GS
HS
JPL
L&R
MACS
MAV
MICNS
MRF
MTBF
MTI
MTTR
O&O
PIDS
PM
RGT
ROC
RPV
RR
SPC
TADAR
TDMA
TSM
TV
air vehicle
command, control/ and communications
Combined Arms Combat Development Agency
centralized ground control station
centralized ground data terminal
centralized launch and recovery
Combat Surveillance & Target Acquisition
Laboratory
direct support
forward ground control station
forward line of own troops
ground control station
general support
hot spare
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
launch and recovery
Multiple Aquila Control System
minimum acceptable value
Modular Integrated Communications and
Navigation System
mission request files
mean time between failures
moving target indicator
mean time to repair
organizational & operational
prime item development specification
program manager
remote ground terminal
required operational capability
remotely piloted vehicle
radio relay
System Planning Corporation
target acquisition, designation, and
aerial reconnaissance
time-division multiple access
TRADOC System Manager
television
Preceding page blank
75
